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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The aim of this thesis is to identify characteristics on how safety facilitators can improve inter-
organizational learning from safety investigations. The study is a response to the fact that the Dutch 
Safety Board questions the learning effects of its accident investigation reports, despite that these 
are freely accessible on the website, which assumes that other organizations can use and learn from 
these reports. Within the maritime sector, the sole release of information does not seem to enhance 
learning that leads to lower accident rates.  
 
In the first chapter, results of a literature review are presented. These show that this domain is 
largely unexplored and therefore this research will add to the academic literature. However, the 
thesis also has practical implications as it identifies incentives. In the second chapter, the method 
is brought to light. In order to expose inter-organizational learning incentives, semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with eight employees within seven different maritime companies in the 
Netherlands. This aimed to reveal possibilities to disseminate safety investigation information to 
organizations not involved in an accident such that it enhances learning.  
 
In the central section the thesis provides facilitators possible incentives to adopt in their 
communication of their safety investigations so as to lower the threshold concerning or enhance 
inter-organizational learning with the purpose of improving safety. Here, the thesis draws on 
academic sources and the previous literature review to reflect these incentives.   
 
In the conclusion chapter, the thesis argues that the results are applicable for facilitating 
information in the maritime sector, and could probably also be used in other transportation 
domains. The main results in the thesis suggest that: 
-­‐   The dissemination of information in the form of written reports should be continued.  
-­‐   The reports should include an abstract and context, and preferably be bilingual, brief and 
positively formulated.  
-­‐   The necessity of anonymity and to stimulate safety is to be supported.  
-­‐   Safety investigations should concentrate on why things normally go wright. Therefore, the 
facilitator/investigator should conduct participative observation and frequently visit 
organizations to discuss safety (items).   
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HOW TO IMPROVE INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING 
FROM SAFETY INVESTIGATIONS? 
 
 
MOTIVE 
 
The Dutch Safety Board (DSB) doubts the learning effects of his accident investigation reports. 
Their written reports, as the final result of their accident investigations (Overheid.nl, 2010, p. 33), 
include the description of the accident, analyses, conclusions and, if necessary, recommendations. 
The reports are published and freely accessible on the website of the Board (Overheid.nl, 2010, p. 
36) and therefore in favor for everybody to read and use. This assumes that any organization is 
able to collect their (written) data and learn from it. However, still accidents, as for example in the 
maritime environment, like falling overboard, losing or injuring body parts or collisions 
(Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid, 2015a, 2015b, 2016a, 2016b) keep on happening.  
  
This research started with the problem of the management team of the Dutch safety board that I 
came across. It was struggling with the inter-organizational effect of the so-called B-safety 
investigation reports within the maritime sector.  Conventionally the focus of this safety board is 
on the learning by organizations that are directly involved in the incident. Other organizations 
could, however, benefit from this information too. For me this raised the question what would be 
needed to establish that broadening out. How could the dissemination of safety investigation 
information after an accident be facilitated such that the information triggers for learning in 
organizations that have not been involved themselves in the occurrence investigated? I discussed 
the necessity of such research with one of the board members. At the same time, the DSB 
implemented a working group that focused on the effects of reports in the aftermath of an 
investigation. Both announced to be curious about the results and stimulated the idea as a master 
student thesis subject.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the beginning of the 20th century different committees have investigated accidents in the 
Netherlands. These investigations used to be carried out by different inspectorates, which were 
usually not independent. Investigators of the Maritime Court, the Inland Waterways Disaster 
Committee, the Civil Aviation Board, and the Railway Accidents Inquiry Board were all 
descendants from their ministries and therefore their independency can be questioned. The 
investigators of these boards were often the same ones as those who established the regulations in 
the first place and acted as a jurisprudential board (Vollenhoven, 2012, p. 144).  
 
Sunday 4 October 1992 was a political turnaround within the Netherlands. An El Al Boeing cargo 
plane crashed in a residential area. In this accident 43 people were killed. At the fire scene people 
were walking in white suits, which was kept an unexplained phenomenon for the public. This 
caused fear with the general public as well as with the disaster relief personnel who have been on 
the scene these days, and it supported the desire to conduct independent investigations. Six and a 
half years after this disaster, a committee of inquiry was erected on the accident as both the 
government and the general public demanded the truth. This accident was the start towards a truly 
independent safety investigation board in the Netherlands, separated from a jurisprudential board. 
The Safety Board was founded on 1 February 2005 (Vollenhoven, 2012; Onderzoeksraad voor 
Veiligheid, n.d.). The aim of the DSB is the improvement of safety and especially in situations in 
which the safety of civilians is dependent on companies, organisations or the government 
(Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid, n.d.a).  
 
On the one hand, according to art 41 (Overheid.nl, 2016), the Board has the authority to decide 
independently, without interference of others, whether an accident will be investigated. The Board 
is responsible for conducting independent safety investigations into the causes of incidents. The 
decision to start such an investigation is based on the Board’s belief that the result will have a 
positive effect on a wider safety improvement. The Board looks for systematic safety shortcomings 
and announces the results to the general public and the parties involved.  
 
On the other hand, international law forces the Board to investigate specific accidents. This 
originates from international covenants and European regulation in the transportation domains 
(Onderzoeksprotocol, n.d.b, p. 7), especially from organizations such as International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO) and International Maritime Organization (IMO). A safety 
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investigation has to be conducted into every very serious marine casualty such as those that imply 
fatalities, a total loss of ships, or severe damage to the [marine] environment (Directive, 2009).   
 
That organizations that are subject to a safety investigation will learn from an accident in their 
organization may be intuitively credible. However, do other organizations in the same branch, 
those that were not involved in the occurrence, also learn from the same accident? This is 
assumable for the rare events (Lampel et al, 2009), but for occurrences with a low attention profile 
it is unknown. These so-called colleague-organizations have free accessibility to information they 
can learn from (the investigation reports from the DSB), but do they? I was not able to find 
scientific literature so far that concentrate specifically on the extent to which third parties, or sister-
organizations, are willing and capable of learning from accidents they were not directly involved in 
while the information was available. 
 
Although the communication department of the Board is able to monitor how many times a report 
on the website is consulted or downloaded, it is not equipped to track persons or organizations 
specifically visiting this website of the Board. This data therefore does not provide a relation 
between a published report and the amount of learning from the report. This is not to say that 
there is no data at all. The available data, however, addresses the general public rather than 
professional organizations. A recent research revealed, for instance, that 59% (N=1000) of the 
general public in the Netherlands is familiar with the Board (Gesellschaft für Konsumforschung, 
2016, pp. 10-11). If asked which authority is responsible for investigating disasters or incidents that 
caused a threat to the safety of civilians, 23% (N=1000) correctly answered DSB. Higher educated 
and older people seemed, however, more aware of the information that the board provides. Also, 
although four percent of the interviewees actively visited the website of the safety board (p. 16), 
more than half of them said they would probably not consult the website in the future (p. 24). This 
raises the question whether the general public is in favor of the Board's product, the reports; and 
if people are learning and willing to learn from this kind of written information.  
 
This data, in other words, although addressing the general public and not the issue of learning by 
sister-organizations, is not very hopeful, obviously, for inter-organizational learning. The Board 
acknowledged this and started to explore the possibilities to improve the communication 
concerning the hand-over of safety investigation information to the ‘outside world’. They did this 
with the aim to enhance learning for sister-organizations, organizations that belong to the same 
branch but that have not been involved in the investigated occurrence in particular. This research 
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attempts to support this initiative by consulting safety departments of different ship owners to 
discuss which facilitation incentives to apply to accomplish that inter-organizational learning effect.  
 
The research question in this master thesis therefore reads as follows: 
 
How should, in the aftermath of a maritime occurrence, the results of safety investigations by third parties (such as 
independent safety investigation authorities) be transfered so as to improve inter-organizational learning?  
 
This thesis will provide insights from a domain that seems largely unexplored and therefore will 
add to the academic literature. Also, by identifying incentives for inter-organizational learning 
across organizations, the thesis can be used by facilitators in how to improve the communication 
of their safety investigation information so as to enhance inter-organizational learning and thus to 
improve safety across organizations.  
 
To keep the research manageable, it has been decided to collect data to answer this question from 
the maritime sector in the Netherlands. Collecting data was done by means of interviews with safety 
managers of several Dutch maritime companies. The interviews focused on getting a better 
understanding in how an independent investigation organization can disseminate safety 
investigation information such that it facilitates the learning of organizations from accidents of 
other organizations. 
 
The second chapter is a reflection of the literature review. The third chapter is a brief description 
of the methodology used to conduct this research. The fourth chapter represent the results, 
followed by the analysis chapter. The six and final chapters are the discussion and conclusions 
respectively. In the appendixes, additional information can be found. The first three appendices 
include the interview invitation, the informed consent and the interview guide. The final two 
appendices contain the in-depth results of the individual interviewees and how these have been 
coded into categories.  
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Following an occurrence, the Dutch Safety Board conducts safety investigations and the obtained 
information is put in writing and published on the website, freely accessible for everybody to read 
and learn from. This embodies the concepts “learning from incidents” (Drupsteen et al, 2013), 
“learning by sharing” (Nesheim & Gressgård, 2014; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995) and transmitting 
information through facilitation (Cagiltay et al, 2015) by a mediating party, in this case the DSB. 
From the perspective of the Board as an independent body, I will elaborate on these concepts 
separately in order to explain the dynamics how organizations can learn from each other when not 
involved in an accident and how a third party, or facilitator, can enhance this. 
 
Learning from incidents and accidents 
Different scholars support the necessity of safety investigations as these investigations can expose 
the causes that have lead to an incident or failure (Reason, 1990; Le Coze, 2008). Logically, if these 
causes are addressed effectively, the repetition of similar accidents can be prevented and/or 
diminished (Pidgeon & O’Leary, 2000; Lukic et al, 2010; Lindberg et al., 2010). At the same time, 
however, other studies conclude that, in spite of the efforts, there is evidence that organisations 
are still not able to reduce the number of incidents. Learning from occurrences, apparently, is not 
such an easy thing to realize. 
 
Still much has been written about learning from incidents, accidents and experience (Choularton, 
2001; Drupsteen et al, 2013; Hovden et al, 2011; Lindberg, 2010; Lukic et al, 2010; Størseth & 
Tinmannsvik, 2012), and also about sensemaking and investigation (Bakx et al, 2013; Dekker, 2014; 
Kletz, 2002; Pupulidy, 2015; Rae, 2016; Sanne, 2008). This research, however, aims to address the 
learning from other organizations’ occurrences, while the literature available focuses mainly on first 
level awareness, meaning learning by organizations directly involved in an incident. Learning is 
(scientifically) defined as “the acquisition of knowledge or skills through study, experience, or being 
taught” (www.en.oxforddictionaries.com) or as “knowledge gained through reading and study” 
(www.ldceonline.com).  
 
Lindberg (2010) was the first to put forward learning from experience (feedback) in safety science. 
Experience feedback she defined as “perceiving, interpreting and analyzing information and 
knowledge on accidents and incidents, including detection, description of the course of event, 
consequences and causes, and the subsequent dissemination and communication of this 
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information to all parties that could benefit from it.” (Lindberg, 2010, p. 5). Experience feedback 
thus focuses on the learning process after an occurrence and the dissemination to all involved for 
cross-sectoral learning, i.e., when one organization learns from another. The concept of experience 
learning is therefore a possible means to be used by a facilitator. I will therefore come back to this 
later in this thesis. 
 
Absorbing facts by reading is a less preferred method (Lindberg, 2010, pp. 15-16) than learning 
from personal experience as it is difficult, sometimes, to communicate the details of complex 
situations by written text. Also, knowledge captured in documents would need to be managed. 
Documents need to be stored, retrieved, read and adjusted (for the specifics of the own 
organization for instance).  
 
Learning at the receiving end is closely related to being taught. “Teaching requires selecting a set 
of knowledge and creating a sequence of learning experiences through which students, groups, or 
organizations engage with that knowledge” [emphasis added] (Rae, 2016, p. 3). Teaching also means 
lecturing, instructing, or showing how to do a job or task, e.g. showing how to do the ropes, and 
assumes that the knowledge is available and that an individual, group or organization is told how 
to do something. Concerning the means of facilitators as discussed in this thesis, teaching is not 
considered within the scope of this thesis.  
 
It seems, from the literature on learning, that there is not much specific knowledge to be found on 
how organizations can learn from events in other organizations. The incentives to learn from 
experiences of colleague organizations cannot, in other words, be derived from this literature, at 
least not from this literature alone. There is, however, a literature on organizational learning that 
may have more to this. 
 
Organizational learning 
 
Although organizational learning occurs through individuals, it would be a mistake 
to conclude that organizational learning is nothing but the cumulative result of their 
members' learning. Organizations do not have brains, but they have cognitive 
systems and memories. As individuals develop their personalities, personal habits, 
and beliefs over time, organizations develop world views and ideologies. Members 
come and go, and leadership changes, but organizations' memories preserve certain 
behaviors, mental maps, norms, and values over time (Hedberg, 1981, p. 6). 
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Contrarily, there are scholars who state i.e. “even when we prepare a good report and circulate it 
widely, all too often it is read, filed and forgotten. Organizations have no memory. Only people 
have memories and after a few years they move on taking their memories with them” (Kletz, 2002, 
p. 5). Therfor, it is important to try to reveal the general scientifical thoughts about organizational 
learning.  
 
Searching on Web of Science for articles and reviews with ‘organizational learning’ in the title within 
the domain of Social Science resulted in 829 English publications for the period 1965 to 2015. The 
subject concerning organizational learning obviously got more attention at the end of the eighties, 
beginning of the nineties (Figure 1). This shows that organizational learning is a young theory.  
 
 
 
A clear definition of organizational learning has been elusive so far. There is a diversity of 
definitions that have been introduced by many different scholars. Argyris (1977, p. 113), for 
instance, defined organizational learning as “a process of detecting and correcting error”. Fiol and 
Lyles (1985) pitch organizational learning as “the process of improving actions through better 
knowledge and understanding” (Fiol & Lyles, 1985, p. 803) following “the knowledge, and 
associations between past actions, the effectiveness of those actions, and future actions.” (p. 811). 
They thus suggest that organizational learning refers to a change in someone’s knowledge that 
occurs as a function of experience. Garvin (1993, p. 80), furthermore, generally constructed “a 
learning organization [as] an organization skilled at creating, acquiring, and transferring knowledge, 
and at modifying its behavior to reflect new knowledge and insights.” A final example is Senge 
(1990, p. 6), "a continuous testing of experience and its transformation into knowledge available to 
whole organisation and relevant to their mission." What all these definitions share in common is 
that organizational learning is a sequential and dynamic process in which new information is 
Figure 1: Publications 'organiz(s)ational learning' per year (retrieved November 20, 2016) 
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acquired, new knowledge is developed, and behaviors are accordingly modified (Huber 1991; Levitt 
& March 1988). 
 
Learning does not have to be generated within the own organization, one can learn from other 
organizations as well. The benefit of this is that the organization does not need to be involved in 
an incident to be able to learn from it. Learning from other organizations is called inter-
organizational learning. To gain this particular learning effect, knowledge must be spread between 
organizations so that the recipient organization can learn from the other organization (Argote & 
Epple, 1990; Huber, 1991; Levitt & March, 1988).  
 
Inter-organizational learning 
A common understanding of inter-organizational learning is that of an alliance between two or 
more organizations in the same industry (Levinson & Asahi, 1995; Larsson et al, 1998), a formal 
connection between organizations. In the situations studied in this thesis, concerning how 
facilitators could stimulate organizations to learn from occurrences in other organizations, such 
formal connection may not be self-evident. A formal bond, however, often does exist with the 
institute of the facilitator and which disseminates the investigation information. The insights gained 
in the context of organizational learning can thus also for this context perhaps be helpful. A 
common professional bond promotes, for instance, trust, effective communication, and mutual 
understanding (Scott, 2000, p. 94), in order to learn from the experiences and best practices of 
other organizations and to transfer knowledge about this. First, however, I elaborate on the 
connection between trust, communication and mutual understanding. Second, it is important to 
look at how knowledge itself can be transferred into something useful to function as a carrier of 
that knowledge. 
 
Trust, communication and mutual understanding 
A well-known condition that influences learning is a culture in which openness and trust are valued. 
If the aim is to learn from an event, there should be no blame for the actors involved and people 
need to feel comfortable to report what happened, the so-called ‘just culture’ (Dekker, 2014; Woods 
et al, 2010). Edmondson (2003) explains that a climate of openness can make people more willing 
to report and discuss errors, and learn more about the system in the process (Edmondson, 2003, 
p. 15). An absence of trust may lead to faulty reporting, lack of reporting, secrecy and less 
transparency (Hovden et al., 2011; Pidgeon & O’Leary, 2000). As Sanne (2008) stipulated, being 
ashamed for a situation or fearing blame or social sanctions can create reluctance to report and 
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therefore limits the information available to be learned from (Sanne, 2008, p. 1211). A lack of trust 
can come from political processes, power conflicts, anxiety and blame (Hovden et al., 2011; Perrow, 
1999). Hovden et al. (2011) furthermore mention that it is necessary that incident investigations 
are independent and excluded from liability and blame questions. For the follow-up, a culture 
valuing openness and trust is also necessary and therefore reports following an investigation should 
be public. This reenforces openness, transparency and facilitation. In short, contexts where 
members trust each other (Levin & Cross, 2004, p. 1480), i.e., feel psychologically safe 
(Edmondson, 2003), tends to promote (inter-)organizational learning. 
 
Knowledge 
The sixteenth century English philosopher Francis Bacon once said that knowledge is power. 
Knowledge allows organizations to stay competitive in a dynamic environment. “It is [however] 
very difficult to become knowledgeable in a passive way. Actively experiencing something is 
considerably more valuable than having it described” (Richardson, 1995, p. 18). So as to understand 
how knowledge can be used for improving the organization (for learning) it is important to take a 
closer look at knowledge and discern different forms of knowledge transformation.  
 
Within the field of knowledge management (KM), two types of knowledge are recognized, explicit 
and tacit knowledge. Nonaka (1994) seems to be one of the first scholars who introduced and 
developed the distinction between the two different types of knowledge, being explicit and tacit, 
and proclaims that the interaction and relationship between the two types of knowledge are the 
basis for KM and the organizational learning theory. Within the same field of science, it is 
mentioned that knowledge is hierarchically related to information, data and wisdom, the so-called 
DIKW or knowledge pyramid. Wisdom is located at the top of this pyramid, knowledge, 
information, and data at the bottom (Ackoff, 1989, p. 3). There is, apparently, no wisdom without 
knowledge, no knowledge without information, and no information without data. From top to 
bottom the pyramid runs from tacit to explicit elements. Both aspects of knowledge and the 
knowledge pyramid, will be discussed here, as well as how the aspects and the knowledge pyramid 
are interacted (Zeleny, 1987; Ackoff, 1989: Rowley, 2006). (Figure 2).  
 
Explicit knowledge, on the one hand, refers to codified knowledge such as can be found in 
documents and is considered to be objective and rational and can be put or transferred in words, 
sentences, numbers or formulas. It includes theoretical approaches, problem solving, instructions, 
manuals and databases. Explicit knowledge could thus relatively easy be transferred on paper. 
Explicit knowledge is dominant in the lowest part of the knowledge pyramid and in accordance 
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with data. Data is defined as symbols that represent properties of objects, events and their 
environment. Data is, in short, the product of observation. Definitions for data largely handle 
though, about what data lacks as data does not include meaning or value. Also, data is unorganized 
and unprocessed (Rowley, 2006, p. 171). Data is thus of no use until it is in a useable (i.e. relevant) 
form. Such data is called information after answering what, where, who and how, data gets meaning 
and can be interpreted.  
 
Tacit knowledge, on the other hand, refers to non-codified and often personal or experience-based 
knowledge. It cannot be expressed like explicit knowledge because it is subjective, experience based 
and context specific. It includes cognitive skills such as beliefs, images, intuition and mental models 
as well as technical skills such as craft and know-how. One of the convincing examples of tacit 
knowledge is facial recognition. “We know a person’s face, and can recognize it among a thousand, 
indeed a million. Yet we usually cannot tell how we recognize a face we know, so most of this 
cannot be put into words” (Polanyi, 1966, p. 4).  Or, as Conklin (2016b) provided food for thought 
in his podcast, the difference between explicit and implicit knowledge is “the difference between 
the stuff you know and can talk about, and the stuff you know and can’t talk about.” Tacit 
knowledge is dominant in the highest part of the knowledge pyramid and in accordance with 
wisdom. Wisdom is the most abstract term in the pyramid and refers to thinking and acting upon 
knowledge. It is related to causes, why something is true, and to answering the how-to question 
(Ackoff, 1989). While data, information and knowledge relate to the past (they deal with what has 
been or what is known), wisdom deals with the future as it incorporates vision and design.  
 
Lam (2000) deepens the explanation of tacit and explicit knowledge by stipulating that knowledge 
can be articulated explicitly or manifested implicitly (Lam, 2000, p. 490). She describes three 
 
Figure 2: The relation DIKW model, and explicit and tacit knowledge (Rowley, 2006) 
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differences between tacit and explicit knowledge. First, tacit knowledge is intuitive and 
unarticulated and can only be communicated if the subject is known while explicit knowledge can 
be codified, stored and communicated even without knowing the subject. Second, explicit 
knowledge can be deducted or learned via study, while tacit knowledge is mastered by ‘learning-
on-the-job’. Finally, explicit knowledge can be gathered together and appropriated, while tacit 
knowledge is distributive, personal and contextual and therefore difficult to aggregate (Lam, 2000, 
p. 490). Botha et al (2008, pp. 22-23), however, points out that tacit and explicit knowledge should 
be seen as a spectrum rather than as definitive points. To understand the phenomenon of 
knowledge though, it is important to define these theoretical opposites points. 
 
Although it is often mentioned by scholars that knowledge and information are used 
interchangeably, a clear distinction is also drawn: “Most people agree that data and information 
may exist outside humans, [while] knowledge can never be separated from the knower” (Stenmark, 
2002, p. 4). Knowledge is as such presumed to be distilled ‘truth’, while information requires the 
human act of interpretation (Galliers & Newell, 2001, p. 611). 
 
Transferring knowledge   
As mentioned, there is no absolute distinction between the tacit and explicit elements of the 
pyramid. Tacit and explicit knowledge, as has been argued above, are inseparable. Their relationship 
can be compared to the analogy of an iceberg above and below the waterline: the exposed explicit 
knowledge is supported by the hidden tacit knowledge. Regardless, however, whether it concerns 
tacit or explicit knowledge, so as to create value in an organization, this knowledge must have the 
ability to be sharable. This learning by sharing can become the driver of (inter-)organizational 
learning. 
 
Different authors stimulate in this to study the role of people in the steps of the organizational 
learning process, and their role in knowledge sharing and processing. Human involvement is 
mentioned by Størseth and Tinmannsvik (2012, p. 1979) as one of the conditions for organizational 
learning and they are supported by other scholars (Birkland, 2009, p. 152; Brizon & Wybo, 2009, 
p. 129; Dekker, 2014). In other words, organizations are not able to learn, it is the individual in an 
organization. 
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Nonaka and Tacheucki (1995) described a knowledge model to show the interaction between tacit 
and explicit knowledge in an organization (Figure 3). The exchange of implicit and explicit 
knowledge, according to this model, takes place in four different processes.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  To	  
From	   tacit	   explicit	  
tacit	   Socialization	   Externalization	  
explicit	   Internalization	   Combination	  
 
Socialization is the process of transforming tacit knowledge to acquire tacit knowledge through the 
interaction based on experience. This can be done in a formal and in an informal manner. Examples 
are observations, discussions and watching. Without some form of shared experience, it is difficult 
for people to establish this, at it needs to share each other’s thinking processes (Nonaka, 1994, p. 
19). Some knowledge or wisdom, high level in the knowledge pyramid, has to be available between 
the two parties to achieve socialization between those levels 
 
The easiest form of knowledge conversion concerns the creation of new explicit knowledge from 
existing explicit knowledge, so-called combination. This is already in place in most organizations. 
Documents, databases, texts and information storages with existing information are reconfigured 
into new knowledge through the sorting, adding, re-categorizing, and re-contextualizing (Nonaka, 
1994, p. 19). 
 
The last two conversions involve the conversion of tacit to explicit knowledge and vice versa. 
These conversion modes capture the idea that tacit and explicit knowledge are complementary and 
can expand over time through a process of mutual interaction. The conversion of tacit knowledge 
into explicit knowledge is called externalization, which is the transformation of what is in 
somebody’s mind into documentation or databases, or in any other tangible form. The conversion 
of explicit knowledge into tacit knowledge is called internalization, i.e. when knowledge from 
documents, simulators and participation is absorbed into their own mental models (Nonaka, 1994, 
p. 19). 
 
In sum, Nonaka’s modes of knowledge conversion include: 
•   Tacit-to-tacit (socialization) – individuals acquire knowledge from each other or others through 
Figure 3: Four modes of knowledge conversion (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995, p. 62) 
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dialogue and observation; discussion and watching. 
•   Tacit-to-explicit (externalization) – the articulation of knowledge into tangible form through 
stimulation and documentation; attention and reading. 
•   Explicit-to-explicit (combination) – combining different forms of explicit knowledge, such as 
that in documents or databases; text and information storage  
•   Explicit-to-tacit (internalization) – learning by doing, where individuals internalize knowledge 
into their own mental models from documents; simulator, participation. 
 
Nonaka’s knowledge conversion modes are of interest within the scope of this thesis. It shows the 
different means available to transfer explicit and tacit knowledge and also to transfer between 
explicit and tacit knowledge. This could be of help for a facilitator, who disseminates safety 
information with the purpose of stimulating cross-organizational learning from occurrences as it 
can enable this facilitator to manoeuvre back and forth through the knowledge pyramid. Knowing 
this, makes it understandable what the maximum knowledge level available is for the facilitator to 
transfer to a sister-organization. The lower the facilitator is ‘stuck’ on a level in the pyramid, the 
more explicit knowledge and the less tacit knowledge is available. Therefore, it is relatively easy in 
terms of time and effort to investigate an occurrence based on data, as law and regulations, then 
try to understand the working environment with the result how an occurrence could happen. For 
an investigator, it is more difficult to reach tacit knowledge and make it understandable afterwards. 
The next chapter will concentrate on the potential means that can be used within the different 
conversions by a facilitator so as to facilitate the transfer of information – such as safety 
information – about or from one organization to another.  
 
Acting as a facilitator in the transfer of knowledge 
Inter-organizational learning has raised the question about how to transmit knowledge between the 
respective organizations. Most organizations don’t have the time or skills to examine all the 
available evidence first hand. Organizations have thus a hard time to create knowledge on their 
own. Taking into account the distinction between explicit and implicit knowledge as well as the 
DIKW pyramid, there are different ways to transfer information from or about one organization 
to another, or to facilitate this information flow.  
 
Although the model of Nonaka is helpful in categorizing different kinds of knowledge transfer, it 
does not make clear what exactly can carry knowledge from one organization to another (in the 
case of an aftermath of an investigation phase for instance). Anyhow, whether knowledge is shared 
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by speech or by written report(s), it has to be converted from an internal, mental understanding, 
into some external transferrable matter and changed back again, to an internal state of 
understanding of the information after receipt by the other organization. A facilitator could 
facilitate this process. The view of the relationship between knowledge and facilitation can then be 
visualized in a simple flow diagram: 
 
KNOWLEDGE     FACILITATION  KNOWLEDGE 
 
Internalization, bottom-up in the knowledge pyramid, concerns finding relations between the 
elements of the received data, followed by putting it to practice. In KM science, much is 
documented about the different means or processes available to establish this (Ackoff, 1989; Ichijo 
et al, 2000; Nesheim & Gressgård, 2014; Nonaka, 1994). If “knowledge is a mix of contextual 
information, values, experience, and rules” (Rowley, 2006, p. 73) internalization, for instance, can 
be improved by dialogue, discussions and experience sharing with peers or with groups of people 
with the same goal. Assumably, this has the potential for disagreement and conflict, but in the end, 
this exchanging of knowledge is necessary to scrutinize existing premises and to make sense of 
experiences in new ways. In contrast, how to externalize knowledge, the top-down process in the 
DIKW pyramid that runs from wisdom to knowledge to information is not clearly described in the 
literature. For the facilitator, it is of interest to have incentives available which in turn will speed 
up the externalization process of the receiver, the sister-organization.  
 
At least one issue is discussed in the literature about this top-down knowledge transfer, “we always 
know more than we can say, and we will always say more than we can write down” (Snowden, 
1999, p. 4). Snowden proclaims with this that, putting wisdom or knowledge into saying or writing 
results in a loss. Externalization, in other words, results in a loss of content and context. Storytelling 
is a useful tool to counter this even though this also cannot fully compensate. “Good stories, told 
well, lead students towards fresh insights and deep understanding” (Rae, 2016, p. 9). Bakx et al. 
plea therefore, that storytelling is a powerful way to share ‘knowledge’ with others (Bakx et al., 
2013, p. 390). Another useful means to transfer tacit to explicit and thus transferable knowledge, 
is the use of metaphors. “A metaphor is one of the most important tools for trying to comprehend 
[at least] partially what cannot be comprehended totally: our feelings, aesthetic experiences, moral 
practices, and spiritual awareness” (Lakoff & Johnsson, 1980, p. 194). ‘‘If a picture is worth 1,000 
words, a metaphor is worth 1,000 pictures! For … a metaphor provides a conceptual framework 
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for thinking about something’’ (Shuell, 1990, p. 102). By using metaphors and reflecting with other 
practitioners, there is thus a good chance that knowledge will increase.  
 
The other two knowledge conversion forms, combination and socialization, do not seem to be 
relevant for facilitators concerning learning from safety information of other organizations. 
Combination looks like the lowest form of learning, from data to data, from explicit to explicit. 
However, absorbing data and making sense of it means learning, and is considered a dynamic 
process. Such process implies within the model of Nonaka, transforming explicit to tacit, vice versa, 
and possibly also tacit to tacit knowledge conversion. So actually, combination requires also an 
amount of tacit knowledge. Concluding that learning appears to involve all the other knowledge 
conversions too, being socialization, externalization and internalization. Therefore, combination 
cannot be introduced as an example of learning, and concludes that publishing a written safety 
investigation report on a freely accessible website is considered learning as long there is an incentive 
involved. A facilitator should be looking for such incentives continuously to enhance learning. 
 
The fourth mode of knowledge conversion, socialization, takes much effort of an investigator. 
Tacit knowledge can, for instance, be acquired through shared experience such as when people in 
the maritime sector learn via traditional apprenticeship where apprentices learn the tacit knowledge 
needed through hands-on experience, rather than from written manuals or other documents. The 
closest way to establish a similar process as investigator (or facilitator) is to spend time on the work 
floor during participative observation (Dewalt & Dewalt, 2002) so as to build a (limited) hands-on 
experience and to be able to discuss or observe the activities. As this takes much time, socialization 
is a conversion method which is difficult to accomplish for an investigator or facilitator. In turn it 
means that they are stuck at a specific level in the pyramid, a probably missing a part in the 
internalization process. This level is the determining factor to start the externalization phase. 
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Figure 4: The relation DIKW model and mutual conversion 
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The simple flow diagram representing the relationship between knowledge and facilitation is at 
own interpretation modified into the model as visualized in figure 5. The model shows three actors 
and the flow of the data between these actors. The three actors are the accident involved 
organization, the facilitator and/or investigator, and the organization that has not been involved in 
the accident. The facilitator collects and receives data from the organization involved in the 
accident, after which he uses the different means of internalization such as sensemaking to 
transform this into information. This can be done by imagination and mental modelling as seen in 
figure 4., it is assumable Therefore that the facilitator’s experience is of importance. The more 
relevant the experience, the better the data can be transformed into information, and thus the 
higher the facilitator can “climb” the pyramid.  
 
 
 
After internalization, the facilitator has to go through the externalization process, which means that 
the facilitator has to modify his internalized knowledge such, by “descending” again in the 
knowledge pyramid, that relevant information can become available for other organizations This 
is the start of the facilitating process. In this stage factors that can incentivize sister-organizations 
to learn from this data, have to be implemented for easier consideration of the internalization 
process.  
 
This information is then transferred to the sister-organization, which uses the internalization 
process to make the data usable as information, and climb further into the pyramid. The facilitator 
is key to support the internalization process of organizations. Therefore, this thesis can bring about 
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incentives to promote this. Focusing on the different possible modes of knowledge conversion and 
the before mentioned means can enhance these processes, the facilitator can enhance learning with 
sister-organizations by using storytelling, metaphors, clarify context, dialogue and/or discussion.  
 
Own experience within the maritime sector and the safety board 
Working as a safety investigator within the maritime sector I experience the classic safety model, 
also reperesented as the Old View thinking (Dekker, 2014) or the First Story (Woods et al, 2010, 
p. 7) within the different organizations. This safety view suggests that work can be analyzed and 
prescribed, and therefore work-as-done should correspond, in this view, with work-as-planned. 
Mostly the human is seen as the problem. This has to be solved by focusing on and removing the 
“rotten apple” (Dekker, 2014, p. 3), as there is resignation or imprisonment. In this perspective, 
investigations are often based on why things go wrong. As such, they aim to find the assumed root-
cause(s) so that the particular occurrence will not happen again. What this approach in fact does, 
however, is that it aims to re-establish the work-as-planned, regardless the reasons that may have 
existed to do the work at it was done.  
 
In an Old View environment, management points fingers at or blames people. This creates an 
hinderance for the exposure of incentives as discovered from the literature review. As long 
employees can be reprimanded for their actions in the Old View world, incentives as trust or open 
communication will not be found in such an organization. For a safety investigation, it is of 
importance to have an open communication to kind of waft the necessary information to build 
context. The board enforces this thought by telling the interviewees that their provided information 
is kept available solely for the board, and not allowed to be used in criminal law, disciplinary action 
law or civil law proceudres (Onderzoeksraad, n.d.b., p. 16).  
 
As result of the safety investigation, the board will construct a draft, and all parties involved in the 
accident are consulted and requested to comment on this draft. The draft consists of a context and 
an analysis of causes. The consulted parties are allowed only to comment on the facts or in case 
the content is not clear, and normally have four weeks to react, the so-called right of access period. 
After this deadline, the board retains his right to accept the comments. If a comment is ignored an 
explanation will be supplemented in the final report. Finally, the report will be prepared for 
publication. Beforehand, the involved parties are informed and receive a hardcopy of the report. 
All reports are also published on the board website and accessible to the public (Onderzoeksraad, 
n.d.b., p. 16). Additionally, an English written report is included in case more nationalities are 
involved in the accident.   
 
 
25 
METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter describes the research process in this thesis. The starting point of my research is that 
not much is known about my research subject of interest. As mentioned before, many of the 
documents that concentrate on learning from incidents, accidents and experience focus mainly on 
first level awareness. This means that these documents primarily regard the learning of those parties 
that are directly involved in an occurrence. Facilitating or providing safety investigation information 
as a critical step in the process of (inter-organizational) learning has not been found within the 
safety science community, at least not as a specific topic.   
 
An exploratory, qualitative method was therefore used, also because a quantitative approach would 
be of limited value for the complex and dynamic arena as the maritime sector. It was judged, 
therefore, that a contextual in-depth sense was necessary as a basis for the interpretation of the 
subjective experiences of the individuals as representatives of the organization studied here.  
 
An interpretative world view is developed in this thesis because the interpretations of the results 
are not straight forward. They can thus differ from one person to another. This, however, does not 
mean that this research is useless. After all the interpretations can well be used as starting points 
for a discussion about how to facilitate learning in the martime domain from occurrences in sister-
orgs.   
 
Data collection 
Several data collection methods were employed to allow different perspectives to ensure greater 
data validity (Thomas, 2013, p. 146). At first, the organization manual and the distribution of the 
safety investigation reports of the DSB were studied, next to international safety branch bodies to 
discover the way in which safety investigation information is generally disseminated by investigating 
authorities.  
 
Secondly, eight semi-structured interviews have been conducted with participants using a semi-
structured protocol.  
 
Participants 
It is important, for this research especially, to interview the right people. In this case, it was 
important to interview those who are in positions able to tell something about not only the 
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dissemination process of safety information, but also about whether this information provides 
triggers for learning in sister-organizations, i.e., in other branch organizations. Respondents have 
thus been sought with a background in the operational field as opposed to the supposedly 
theoretically trained managers who may answer more ‘by the book’. This information I can find 
elsewhere.  
 
Specifically, those people have been approached that have the authority to suggest modifying rules, 
to filter information and who are responsible for intra-organizational distribution of safety 
information. In other words, those people who normally should act as the link between safety 
investigation information and the work floor of their organization assumably. As a minimum, the 
interviewees had to be familiar with the Dutch safety investigation board, as the only body in the 
Netherlands assigned to conduct independent safety investigations that have no link whatsoever 
with jurisprudential processes or investigations. If they are not, it is assumable that they put 
attention on blaming and not in the position to learn from accidents indirectly.  
 
I used the DSB’s maritime distribution list, a collection of all the DSB’s contacts in the maritime 
sector gathered in the last two years, as basis for getting in touch with these employees. They were 
the ones who voluntary came forward to take part in this research. All the organizations on the 
mentioned list received a copy of the Report Occurrences Shipping (ROS), a semi-annually report 
describing briefly the occurrences of the last half year concerning Dutch vessels and crewmembers 
and those occurrence that took place in Dutch coastal waters. This list of contacts is filled with 
roughly 200 names, whom I sent an invitation (see appendix A). Based on the replies I formed a 
pool of interviewees. Initially there were not enough positive responses, so I resent a reminder. 
The final result was the total number of eight interviews with nine participants who were all 
involved within the safety and/or quality department at (middle) management level of seven ship-
owning companies. Based on the list of 200 potential interviewees, I was disappointed initially with 
nine available respondents. However, the number of interviews was limited, I decided to continue 
my research using interviews anyway. Based on the theory about data saturation (Francis et al, 2010; 
Baker & Edwards, 2012), there was a possibility that the results may not be representative for the 
maritime sector. 
 
The interviewees had different backgrounds. Most of them had practical, sailing experience, one 
started fulfilling the office job immediately after receiving an education degree. In the thought of 
Nonaka (see theoretical section in chapter 2), this background differentiation can be of influence 
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on the conversing of information. For instance, if office employees do not have work floor 
experience, ample tacit knowledge is available, and efficient internalization is hampered. Therefore, 
it was of interest to discover and discuss incentives to enhance the conversion process. 
 
Semi-structured interviews 
After writing the literature review and formulating the research question, I started to build an 
interview protocol. I decided to do semi-structured interviews. This would allow me to have a 
conversation with the interviewees in such a way that it appreciates their perspectives concerning 
the topic of research (i.e., it allows them to bring up different emerging topics) and the freedom to 
use follow-up questions if necessary.  
 
The questions focused on how learning effectively can be facilitated in favour of organizations not 
involved in an accident. Focus was on the incentives already in place, but also new incentives were 
searched for. All in all, the interviews were directed on how and why people in branch organizations 
could be elicited by safety investigation information. Reading the literature, I was drawn towards 
exploring the contextual issues of (social) aspects, such as transmitting knowledge and information. 
Are there aspects available that can be used by a safety investigation board to stimulate the urge to 
learn from others? Qualitative research allows me to do that under the design frame of an interview.  
 
The interviews were gradually built up from the introduction of the interviewee towards a deeper 
understanding of safety and the way safety was discussed at the work floor. Ideas emerging from 
the answers were discussed or led to other questions. The interviews were not restricted to a 
specific order of questioning. These interviews were recorded and were no longer than 90 minutes. 
And finally, after each of the interviews the participants were given the opportunity to reflect on 
and provide responses. Interviewees were given the possibility to give a last response after receiving 
their transcribed version of the interview. 
 
The interview questions were sent beforehand to the interviewees personally by email after 
commitment to participate in this research. Having the questions available at forehand, would give 
them the possibility to discuss the questions within their own organizations. 
 
Data Analysis 
The literature review revealed a storyboard (figure 6) which brought emerged ideas or themes 
together. Initially, the research question Which incentives to use in safety investigation information will 
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improve learning from others? was formulated. This started a search within safety science for documents 
containing learning, organizational learning and inter-organizational learning. In here, the 
assumptions were that it was possible to learn from others and and safety investigations lead to 
learning, and would be verified during the interview. The literature studied, as mentioned before, 
however, mainly concentrated on safety investigations and on learning from incidents, accidents 
and experience focusing on first level awareness, meaning that the literature focuses mainly on the 
learning of parties that are directly involved in an occurrence. Learning evolved my curiosity about 
knowledge, what it is and how it can be transferred between bodies. It became clear that continue 
searching within the safety science area would limit what is there to unreveal about knowledge. So 
as to find the necessary literature I commenced to the snowball-effect; reading and collecting 
literature found on Web of Science that elaborated about (inter-) organizational learning and 
knowledge management. And from there incentives where found as answer to the research 
question. Obviously, I left the possibility open to introduce incentives from the interviews. Finally, 
the research question was formulated as How to improve inter-organizational learning from safety 
investigations?  
  
 
 
 
The questions used for the interviews focused partly on the belief and possibility of inter-
organziational learning anyway, on the presence of inter-organziational learning nowadays and how 
(safety) learning was interpreted. This could be compared to my assumptions, represented by the 
How$to improve inter-organizational
learning from safety investigations?$
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Figure 6: The storyboard 
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left part of figure 6. Other questions focused on the dissemination of safety investigation 
information nowadays and why these got attention and how it was disseminated witin the 
organization. This covered the right part of figure 6. The third block of questions generated to 
provoke other potential incentives to be used by a facilitator as seen by the interviewees.  
 
The data collected were recorded and transcribed. The data was then manually coded, themes were 
identified and relationships were determined in order to present the main findings. Since there is 
no specific scientific literature available on inter-organizational learning in the maritime domain, 
this was an exploratory study aimed at uncovering incentives to be used for safety investigation 
information facilitation. Therefore, I expected the data during the analysis process to become 
clearer along the way as the research progressed. The more I immersed in the data, the more the 
context and the case became clearer. Due to the relatively small data set I used MS Excel and MS 
Word software; I identified themes from the interview data, and coded initially using the comments 
function in the MS Word. Due to the small number of interviewees, all aspects or factors were 
considered of importance and therefor documented and collected independently when mentioned 
by these different individuals. I then transferred to MS Excel so as to verify the coding and 
categorization of the data.  
 
Eventually this led to a set of categories that emerged from the data set, which I processed in the 
analysis. I then had discussions with my colleagues at the DSB concerning these research results. I 
especially tried to find out whether how the maritime world looked at the board was in line with 
the thoughts of my colleagues. This whole process let to the identification of fifteen major themes. 
Seven of them concerned incentives about written reports specifically; eight themes addressed 
other facilitating incentives. 
 
A number of possible limitations to the study’s set up have been identified. First, qualitative 
research generally has to do with the subjective view of the researcher of what is important. This 
can cause an area of conflict with replicating the study, as a result of a lack of standards in 
interpretation. Another limitation could possibly be the influence of my manager who had a direct 
interest in the outcome of the research. Maintaining objectivity on his part was crucial. This issue 
has been addressed to him at the start of the research and we both have monitored this during the 
research period. 
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Ethics 
The interviewees will basically respond to the DSB’s safety investigation information, which is 
freely accessible online. Therefore, I do not expect ethical issues regarding the safety board using 
this data. 
Concerning the participants, their responses will be held in confidence. Initially, only I as the 
researcher involved in this study and those responsible for research oversight, my supervisor and 
assessor as representatives of the Lund University Human Factor and Systems Safety, will have 
access to any information that could identify the participants. This is to prevent any tension about 
commercial sensitivity or reputation damage. There is a possibility that the data will be shared with 
other researchers, for instance so that they can check the accuracy of my conclusions, but I will 
only do so if I am confident that confidentiality of the participant is protected.  
 
The responses of the individual participant have been numbered. The code that links that number 
to the participant’s name will be stored separately from the rest of participant’s data. When any 
result from this study is published, I will do so in a way that the organization cannot be identified 
unless specific permission is received.  
 
In the appendix of the study, the informed consent form (ICF) and the interview questions can be 
found. I sent the ICF beforehand of the interview, and handed it out just minutes before the 
interview so as to discuss it shortly face-to-face with the informants. In the ICF I address several 
ethical issues of my research such as the permission to audio-tape the interview, uncomfortable 
questions, transcripts and member checks, the possibility to alter the final transcript, the handling 
of the interview information afterwards, and voluntary participation. I pointed out furthermore 
that, because of the anonymity in this research, participation will not affect the relationship with 
the safety board and that the participant or organization will not benefit from being in this research. 
Finally, I did point out that this study is designed to learn more about the mechanics of success 
concerning the facilitation of safety information in order to enhance inter-organizational learning. 
Participation in the research may hence potentially have a long-term leverage.  
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EMPIRICAL SECTION 
 
This chapter describes the results of the semi-structured interviews. The interviews focused on 
getting a better understanding in how an independent investigation organization can disseminate 
safety investigation information such that it facilitates the learning of organizations from accidents 
of other organizations. The interviews furthermore helped to map the situation in the companies 
as they are currently processing this information.  
 
All seven companies participating in the research appeared to have a similar structure consisting of 
a CEO level, a middle management level and a work floor level. The work floor level includes those 
who operate and maintain the ships, the so-called sharp end.  
 
General findings 
All interviewees mentioned that the employees on the working level all communicate via the ship 
captain. “At sea, the ship’s captain is at the top of the hierarchy pyramid. In our reporting system, 
the captain is the relay between the ship crew and the company” (Interviewee 5). Another 
commonality concerns the different nationalities that are usually on board the ships, which include 
Asian (Indonesians and Filipinos), Russian, Ukrainian, Polish and Dutch people at all levels on 
board. “As an organization, you have to be aware and take into account the different cultures” 
(Interviewee 7) All interviewees emphasized that this complicates the distribution and 
communication of safety information to the ships. I will eleborate on this later. 
 
The interviewees were asked for several aspects regarding the distribution and communication of 
safety investigation information concerning an accident in a colleague-organization. These aspects 
include the remembrance of that and whether were incentives could be identified that provoked 
their organization to (re)act upon this accident in the other organization. Another question was 
how the safety investigation information is usually distributed from the office to their ships and on 
board their ships. The question whether they think it is possible that organizations can learn from 
accidents in other organizations concluded the interview.  
 
Factors that stimulate the noticing of the availability of safety information about 
occurrences in sister-organizations 
It became clear that large accidents that had been in the news, such as Piper Alpha, Costa 
Concordia, or the Herald of Free Enterprise, were remembered. This was initially caused by the 
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public and/or media reaction in the aftermath of an accident. Another reason concerned the impact 
on the shipping branch itself. One of the respondents mentioned that the Costa Concordia disaster 
has left its mark within the cruise shipping environment, like building an own training center and 
a modified design to ensure the same bridge on every cruise ship (Interviewee 7).  
 
Accidents that result in the modification or imposing of over-all regulations were also remembered 
according to the interviewees. Being curious about the reaction of European Maritime Safety 
Agency (EMSA) after implementing regulations and an organization failed to follow these 
regulations, appeared to be a key driver. EMSA is a European authority helping to enforce the 
legislation formulated by the European Committee.  
 
The interviewees had, however, difficulties to reproduce the moment the before mentioned major 
accidents had happened and what was learned from them. Asking the same question related to 
other, more minor accidents had the same result.  
 
Safety learning – what does it constitute and is learning from sister-organizations possible? 
The interviewees concluded that defining safety learning was a difficult question. All agreed, 
however, that safety learning had to do with being transparent and sharing information of bad 
experiences or accidents to learn from it. Adjusting attitude was for most of the respondents equal 
to a culture change. Most of the interviewees argued that safety learning was part of being 
compliant to the safety management system (SMS). This SMS, according to them, assures a safe 
interaction with the hostile or dangerous working environment; sticking or adjusting to the SMS 
keeps you safe. Partly, because this SMS describes the process concerning incident reporting 
method and the actions to be taken to enhance learning and prevent incidents from happening 
again.  
 
The interviewees also pointed out also that there is a theoretical and a practical side to learning, the 
latter of which, they said, refers to experience, a skill that develops over time. An experienced 
engineer, for instance, can tell you when an engine is not running properly by the noise that it 
makes. This is a gift or a skill that cannot be taught at school but develops through experience, 
often handed over during on-the-job training or indirectly from other organizations (Argote & 
Epple, 1990; Huber, 1991; Levitt & March, 1988). Some respondents mentioned that visiting the 
ships themselves would be important for facilitators for experiencing how a particular job is done 
onboard (Interviewee 6).  
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The interviewees agreed that it was possible to learn from colleague-organizations, also when the 
information is provided by a third party in the role of facilitator like the Dutch Safety Board that 
makes safety information about accidents in one particular organization available for others. One 
of respondents was insulted even, and could not belief that I asked the question (Interviewee 8).  
 
Facilitating incentives 
This research is looking for how the dissemination of safety information can be made available to 
other organizations by a facilitator (such as the DSB), so as to enhance inter-organizational learning. 
One of the issues that have been discussed directly with the interviewees is whether the safety 
information itself can contain incentives (or inhibitors) for learning. Different incentives from 
example accidents have been discussed with the interviewees, after which, the interviewees 
themselves were given the opportunity to bring in the incentives that, to their opinion, would 
enhance inter-organizational learning.  
 
Bilingual reports 
A request to facilitate reports not only in the own native language but also in English could enhance 
learning according to two of the respondents. Because most of the ship crews contain multiple 
nationalities, English is the commonly spoken language on board. Reports in English would 
therefore enhance learning for a broader community (Interviewees 1 and 7). Also, it would decrease 
the time spent by other crew members or staff with translating the reports, as mentioned by one 
of the interviewees. 
 
Brief report – summary, visualization, clear language and title  
Crew members do not have too much time to spend on reading a report. Also, it will lose their 
attention and with that the possibility to learn. Ideally, reports are thus lean and mean, or at least, 
as one of the interviewees explained: “Easy readable report, so it can be read during a watch period” 
(Interviewee 3). Half of the interviewees suggested in this regard to including a summary on one 
of the first pages, and to use clear language. The report title they also thought important as a title 
can increase or decrease somebody’s curiosity and with that the willingness to start reading. Stories, 
to conclude with, could be better understood, according to the interviewees, when they were 
supported visually, such as with pictures or drawings. A related incentive mentioned by one of the 
respondents was a fully visualized report, such as an animation. Another incentive in the 
visualization domain that was mentioned was the related content presenter in video sites such as 
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YouTube. For example, when somebody watches a video on a particular accident on YouTube, 
suggestions of other videos with related content will appear on the same site, which often makes 
that looking at one safety related video leads to the viewing of many others. As such was it seen as 
a modern initiator of broadening one’s view on safety perception. One other respondent explained 
that the organization is involved in e-learning by computer based training (CBT) including real life 
examples of accidents anonymously online, called Videotel. The website is shown onboard to learn 
from different situations and especially from incidents (Interviewee 1).  
 
Two reports, one for the office, one for the ship crew 
One of the interviewees explained preferring two different reports in one package. One report 
destined for the management in the office, and one in English language earmarked for the crews 
on board (Interviewee 3). That way, time could be saved by office employees for other, perhaps 
more important, activities than filtering the message in the report and modifying this to useable 
fragments to read on board. The interviewee reasoned that the safety investigator has the correct 
knowledge about what happened and therefore the only person to write about it; so, why not at 
the same time a second report ready to send to the ships?   
 
Blaming, carrots and sticks, statistical comparison 
Changing attitudes by using carrots and sticks, and by the implementation of regulations was in 
favor of almost all the interviewees. Change and thus learning, according to them, is only possible 
by punishment, reward and law. This was expressed as ‘sailor of the month’ using a medallion or 
putting a picture on the wall on board the ship. Another example was using a red card as a warning, 
and after receiving two or three red cards an employee was fired. For other respondents, it was 
important to show their (safety) statistics compared to other companies by implementing statistics, 
and reporting not only accidents but also incidents. That way companies felt stimulated to continue 
their (good) work concerning their safety perception, or adjust their view on safety improvement 
in case the statistics did not show progression. 
 
Anonymity 
Two interviewees were convinced it was of the companies’ interest that reporting should not lead 
to blaming, because this would decrease the motivation to report incidents. Because of this, they 
considered that the safety information should be anonymized. Anonymity, non-reputability, is 
important also because the rivals in the branch may otherwise undermine your position in the 
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competing maritime sector by displaying you as an unsafe company. This issue was mentioned by 
all the interviewees during the interview. 
 
Similarities in context / contextual similarities 
Three interviewees recognized that similarities in procedures, type of ship and material usage 
function as incentives for organizations to focus on the incident and to reflect on the own 
organization. Recognition of such contextual issues, the working environment, the actors involved, 
as well as the presence of mutual relations between organizations, were all considered key to 
whether safety investigation information was considered valuable. An example given was an 
incident with a not properly working winch that lowered life rafts that was identical to the winch 
used in the own company. The technical incident triggered the company, as sister-organization, to 
take a closer look of their own winches (Interviewee 8). Another case included a fatal accident 
when conducting operations that were equal to own operations in relation to enclosed spaces 
(Interviewee 4). Enclosed spaces have to be treated as dangerous environments due to atmospheric 
hazards. These affect air quality and present immediate hazards to health or life. Acceptable 
atmospheric conditions must be verified before entry, and must be monitored continuously while 
the space is occupied. The oxygen concentration, the presence of toxic gases, and flammable 
material are the three conditions that must be monitored (Interviewee 4).  
 
Personal aspects 
One defining factor for absorbing information about accidents appeared to be related directly to 
the motivation and interest of the individual, in this case the interviewees who are all, as this is 
important to note here, safety or quality managers. As they mentioned, pursuing safety is their 
mission to focus on. While for the other personnel of the organization the final product or outcome 
as result of a customer request is the mission.  
 
Another factor that was mentioned was whether the accident got attention via media and/or formal 
announcements. Personal involvement in accidents was reported as another motivational factor. 
One interviewee mentioned, for instance, that the loss of one of his classmates on board a ship 
during the nautical college course due to using uncertified, electrical tools made such an impression 
at that moment, that nowadays it motivates him to focus continuously on the certification process 
on board the ships and is stipulated during audits (Interviewee 2).   
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Social impact 
One of the respondents proposed to show the personal impact of an accident as an incentive for 
learning from accidents of sister-organizations (Interviewee 1). Losing a husband or father will 
have an impact on the financial and social life of a family. This information can be used to 
emotionally connect to the reader. Discussing this potential incentive resulted into an ethical 
dialogue. The other respondents experienced ethical objections concerning this incentive. They 
argued that it did not feel good to show somebody’s grief and resembled an employee making a 
mistake purposely which can be harder to accept by the relatives.  
 
Active learning approach in reports 
One of the interviewees preferred provoking the reader by questioning: “Could this happen to you 
too?” By asking this question repeatedly during the unfolding of the context step by step, the 
interviewee was convinced that the reader could be lured into the incident. This in a sense is a 
possibility to convince that the same thing could happen to the organization resulting into an 
incident. This being said, luring could, according the same respondent however, result in an evasive 
reaction such as that will not happen here, perhaps even more when the report is written in a very 
negative manner. 
 
Positive stories 
Unfortunately, when a safety investigation report is available, it often tends to emphasise the 
negative outcome, an incident or accident. The focus of safety investigation reports should 
therefore, according to the respondents, not be on wrong stories only, but also on the good ones . 
Publishing reports about positive outcomes, why did something work the way it was planned? 
Interviewee 5 mentioned that organizations do not want to be related to bad things, actions or 
incidents, but rather compliant to positive stories. This idea is supported by for example Conklin 
(2016c) who mentioned: “We know that we are better when we talk about success.” 
 
Speed of dissemination of safety information 
Interviewees thought that, when aiming for the best learning effect, it would be important to have 
the investigation information announced as soon as possible after an accident. Reasons for this 
were the frequent swapping of crew members, which may cause the dwindling of attention for an 
accident over time resulting into forgetting the occurrence. Also, as long as it is unknown if the 
current environment is safe enough to fulfill the task unrest among the organization and ship crew 
members may occur. 
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Timing and focus authorities 
When authorities, like an inspectorate such as IMO or EMSA, have announced to exercise 
supervision on a sister-organization concerning specific items, the community is monitoring the 
outcome of that supervision. One of the interviewees mentioned an example in which the IMO 
focused on controlling the enclosed space entry. This is a space on board the ship, which is initially 
unhealthy for a person to enter, and a safety procedure has to be followed in order to do so. As 
accidents still happen in this space, other organizations were curious about the reaction of the IMO 
and monitored how they would deal with an incident like that.  
 
Another example was when accidents happen in a slow period, silly season, when no incidents are 
expected or supposed to happen. So, a single occurrence draws attention which results into a lower 
threshold concerning inter-organizational learning. Also, the consideration concerning the period 
of release of specific safety investigation information about season related activities can be in favor 
of inter-organizational learning.  
 
Facilitation by meetings and workshops 
Another incentive brought up by two interviewees was organizing meetings and workshops in 
which the results of safety investigations and incidents are discussed. To make this structural, 
however, it should be organized centrally, by a facilitator for example. This way of facilitating thus 
needs an organization or authority that is willing to take the initiative to arrange.  
 
Trusting capability of investigators and credibility of the facilitator 
Considered important by the interviewees was also whether they felt trust in the external party 
regarding the way in which they conduct investigations and come to their final results. Trust in the 
investigator’s capability, in other words, can facilitate learning from sister-organizations according 
to them.1 The use of correct terms by the investigators can help here, as that suggests that the 
investigator understands the sector. Highlighting relevant perspectives of an occurrence, which are 
recognizable for those in the sector, will help in this also as it makes an investigation more 
complete. Organizations are motivated to learn from such information compared to incomplete 
information, according the respondents.  
                                                
 
1 Often the results of external safety investigation reports are compared to the own safety investigation results. 
Despite the different investigation methods, the result of every method should more or less be the same, according 
the interviewees.  
 
 
38 
 
The final incentive to mention is the credibility of a facilitator, especially when this authority is also 
the safety investigation institute. The respondents argued that information facilitated by the 
investigation board is formulated after a thorough investigation and therefore it was generally 
considered of a high standard. Sometimes, however, the information was not correct, but most of 
the time they thought the investigation board advocated the ‘truth’.  
 
The urge for written reports 
Interviewees argued that it is important to continue to use written reports as information transfer. 
Although most ships have internet capabilities, transferring information in written reports will take 
less bandwidth and megabytes, and with that less money and time, compared to, for instance, 
movies or other media distribution. Written reports are considered by the interviewees as the only 
less time consuming means of information transfer to enhance learning when on board the ship. 
 
Inhibitors and facilitators of inter-organizational learning in the on-board processing of 
safety information 
 
Safety management system 
About the way, the safety information is moving within the companies, the respondents described 
that the company is sending safety related information, including the information about 
occurrences in other organizations, to the ship. According to the interviewees, the distribution of 
safety information about occurrences in other organizations from their respective staffs to the ships 
all run according to what has been laid down in their safety management systems (SMS). Within 
the scope of this study there was no room to really check this. The respondents were convinced 
that there were no discrepancies present. One interviewee explained that the company had 
established a workgroup of sailors to close the gap between the office management and ship crews. 
In this way, the company has a tool to influence the (right) connection concerning the translation 
of information in favor of the multi-lingual crews, and the distribution of this information. Due to 
frequent communication between this workgroup and the captain the interviewee continued, the 
latter is more motivated and stimulated to use different tools or means to get safety information 
transferred to the crew.   
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Safety meetings 
All the respondents explained that, in accordance with SMS, on board the ships mandatory safety 
meetings are organized. The as-planned description is as follows. The safety meetings are fixed and 
take place, depending which company’s SMS is involved, every two or four weeks. During these 
meetings, safety is a fixed agenda item. This item gives space to the different subjects, like 
(potential) incidents on board or received safety investigation information concerning other 
organizations, and are discussed. The participants consist at least of the second officer as the safety 
officer and chairman, the second engineer officer and one of the sailors. All companies, except 
one, received feedback of these meetings. This feedback denotes the date, times, participants and 
issues discussed during the meeting and are reported to the office via the captain.  
 
Within one company senior management conferences were arranged among the ships in the fleet 
annually. This allowed face-to-face communication between the company staff and the ship 
officers, during which cross-level safety items can be discussed. Another two respondents told that 
their company established telephone communication with the captains monthly, and that the safety 
officer and chief engineers met semi-annually. 
 
Transparency of on-board processing, attitude, culture 
All interviewees, who don’t work on board the ships themselves, mentioned that it is difficult to 
determine the way safety information distribution is really handled on board the ships, the so-called 
work-as-done (WAD). The best way to get an idea about this dynamic process on board, they say, 
is to visit the ship and observe. The second-best way to find this out is to study the mandatory 
safety meeting and drill feedbacks, and incident reports from a ship. Sometimes, drill feedbacks 
and reports showed the same text over and over again, like the ship safety officer and/or the captain 
had ‘cutted-and-pasted’ the answers from earlier reports (Interviewee 2). Such handling of safety 
information, the respondents argued, is reason to be suspicious about the integrity of handling 
safety information on board as this suggests that safety is not considered an important item on 
board or an issue to take seriously. On the other hand, a few interviewees questioned the necessity 
to know how safety information was distributed on board when discussing learning from sister-
organizations. They did not want to undermine the captain’s position, who is responsible for the 
procedures on board. Others argued that the distribution of safety information on board, inter- or 
intra-organization, has much to do with the safety attitude on board the ships and that changing 
attitudes will not happen or will at least be a very slow process. One interviewee wondered how to 
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get a better understanding of intrinsic motivation. This asked whether and how a process could be 
installed that could change that intrinsic motivation. 
 
Multi-national, -lingual and -cultural crews 
Three respondents believed that the different nationalities in a crew hampered the distribution of 
safety information on board. First, the mother tongue is obviously the best way to absorb 
information and learn. If the language used for distribution of information is not the crew 
member’s first language, it is assumable that not all the information is understood and therefore 
learning is hampered. A second way in which the different nationalities may hamper the distribution 
of safety information may have to do with the different backgrounds or cultures that are not all 
safety minded as believed correct in the Western culture. Interviewee 2 gave an example that it 
became clear during a holiday in Indonesia; people were standing on top of a house skeleton 
building a roof throwing tiles while wearing flip-flops and no falling arrest harness. Other examples 
concern assertiveness and loyalty. European and Asian crew are believed as opposed to Indonesian 
or Filipino crews to question the staff. This attitude was exposed during the different staff visits 
on board, or during meetings and conferences organized ashore. This questioning keeps the 
officers on their toes, initiates and holds the momentum of safety thinking. Russians and Ukraine 
crew members, on the other hand, are assumed to use other incentives based on cultural 
backgrounds. It’s all about their [crew memebers] thoughts. You could be talking for hours why 
things go wrong and everybody agrees. Finally, everybody get back on the ship and they continu 
working without adjustments (Interviewee 1). This remark suggests that information disseminated 
by a facilitator from, in this case, a Western European culture, not automatically results in learning 
by the receiving people from another culture. As different backgrounds and values means as much 
different views on life and working environment. This can hamper inter-organizational learning as 
interpreted by the facilitator.  
 
Options for inter-organizational learning in the future 
Despite the many hampering inter-organizational learning factors mentioned here, the respondents 
were positive about the possibilities to learn from other organizations in general in the future. The 
biggest concern they mentioned are the different nationalities and with that the different cultures 
on board. Because from these different cultures come different safety perspectives resulting into 
different safety attitudes. Some cultures are assumed to serve in favor of the company’s needs 
(Interviewee 6). Others, on the other hand, are generally regarded to show less loyalty to the ship 
companies and act upon the organization with the highest salary (Interviewee 4).   
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ANALYSIS 
 
This chapter is dedicated to the analysis and aimed to discuss the possible incentives that facilitators 
could use to improve (inter-organizational) learning from safety investigations. The first part 
focuses on incentives in line with the incentives found in the literature review. Followed by 
additional incentives filtered from the interviews. 
 
Remarkably, as mentioned, all the interviewees had difficulties to recall when major accidents had 
happened and what was learned from them. Focusing on minor accidents had the same outcome. 
It seemed that the moment of implementing measures after an accident investigation to prevent it 
from happening again, is directly related to the moment to start forgetting the accident. This is in 
line with the human behavior after an accident has their world disrupted. The way they thought 
things were, is not the way it seems to be, and the world is scarier place which needs to be returned 
to normal. So, they need to have an explanation (Conklin, 2016a). When it is understood, measures 
can be put in place, and people continue living their life. 
 
Possible incentives to be used 
 
Context matters 
An aspect that was emphasized by the interviewees is that contextual similarities would cause 
organizations to have a closer look at the safety information of a particular occurrence. What is 
meant here is that when the organizations show similarities, or when they recognize that this 
particular occurrence could easily happen in the own organization, that people in other 
organizations, according to the interviewees, would be more eager to pick up information about 
this occurrence. Context, in other words, is important, something that also followed from the 
literature: especially tacit knowledge is, according to Lam (2009) “distributive, personal and 
contextual.” To transfer tacit knowledge requires, therefore, the issuance of context, something 
that, especially in written reports, is very difficult. Nonaka, for instance pointed out that 
externalization (the process in which tacit knowledge is converted into explicit knowledge like 
written reports) always leads to a loss of context. On the other hand, according to Nonaka can re-
contextualization, which happens during an investigation in which data first is converted into tacit 
knowledge and then back again into explicit knowledge, also lead to new knowledge and insights. 
More needs to be learned about these processes therefore, which brings me to the topics for further 
research. 
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Trust of investigator/facilitator, mutual understanding and participative observation to gain 
Also, considered important for the facilitation of sister-organizational learning, according to the 
research results, is trust. It is imaginable communication is necessary for the facilitation process in 
order to enhance learning. “High levels of trust are key to effective communication” (Dodgson, 
1993, p. 78) as trust ‘‘improves the quality of dialogue and discussions . . . [which,] facilitates the 
sharing of . . . knowledge’’ (Ichijo et al, 2000, p. 200, [emphasis added]. When the facilitator of the 
information is not trusted within the branch, initially there is a tension on externalization, 
questioning if the facilitator able to enhance learning. An effective facilitator role thus implies an 
effective relationship between the facilitator and the organization that an investigation authority 
wants to reach out to.  
 
It is therefore important to build trust in the relationships. One option to establish this is to 
perform safety investigations from the perspective of participative observation. The observer walks 
around on the work floor to get an idea about the sharp end environment. Participative observation 
is therefore a way to establish an environment of trust in favor of the investigator and/or facilitator. 
 
Accident prevention . . . is also realized when readers make[s] sense of the 
information presented and convert the narrative and contextual information into 
meaning or significance based on their own suite of experience . . . To achieve this 
goal there must be a shared level of trust between the individual reader and the 
information-conveyance method and/or process that created it. (Pupulidy, 2015, p. 
134). 
 
Safety thinking paradox, New View versus Old View, and participative observation to hinder 
Next to my own experience I observed also during the interviews, the persistence of the paradox 
between the new and classic safety model, the Old View (Dekker, 2014). This Old View respresents 
the thought that work can be analyzed and prescribed, and therefore work-as-done should 
correspond with work-as-planned. Investigations are aimed to find the root-cause(s) so that the 
particular occurrence will not happen again and that way the safe world re-established. Old View 
investigations therefore tend to have a negative commutation that it, however, still very present in 
many safety sectors. 
 
Interviewees suggested, for instance, to use blaming and shaming such as nominating an employee 
of the month, and to address inter-organizational statistical incident comparison in the safety 
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investigation reports as incentives. Such incentives can be seen as elements of the classic view on 
safety, which sees human error as the root cause of incidents. Recommendations in this view often 
concern the attitudes of people that, according to this view, have to be changed by means of quick 
fixes such as more regulation and technology (Dekker, 2014, p. 191).  
 
The herefore mentioned quick fixes are in fact false. That is at least what follows from the new 
safety model (Dekker, 2014). Human error is in this model not the answer or conclusion of a safety 
investigation but the starting point of a safety investigation as human error, according to this view, 
has to be seen as a symptom. The safety thinking paradox is created when employees are stimulated 
to report incidents and accidents but that reprimand will follow after negligence or criminal steps. 
As long as this paradox holds, facilitating safety learning will be hampered. “It [Old View] has been 
tried for decades, without noticeable effect. Safety improvement comes from abandoning the idea 
. . . that people are the major threat to otherwise safe systems” (Dekker, 2014, p. 2).  
 
The safety thinking paradox was also stipulated by interviewees in the discussion of two different 
types of safety investigation reports, one for the office managers and one for the ship crew. This 
enhances the gap between the operational level and managerial level, or the so-called sharp-end 
and blunt-end within an organization. Because not the own organization, but the facilitator takes 
the initiative to decide what is of importance for the sharp-end and with that pushing the focus of 
the organization in a direction which is possibly not correct. 
 
Hollnagel et al (2013), as alternative of the herefore mentioned re-establishing work-as-planned by 
asking why things go wrong, argues to ask why things go wright, and then try to ensure that it 
happens again. Practically, this means that safety can be improved by meeting the operational 
people on the work floor, and try to understand that operational environment. For an investigator, 
this action can be embodied by conducting participative observation. Some respondents mentioned 
that visiting the ships would be important for facilitators for experiencing how a particular job is 
done onboard. Apparently, they find this important as this would help them to build context, which 
could benefit the investigation in favour of learning. Participative observation is a process that can 
enable researchers to learn about the activities of the people under study in the natural setting 
through observing and participating in those activities (Dewalt & Dewalt, 2002, p. 260). “He 
[participative observer] enters into conversation with some or all of the participants in these 
situations and discovers their interpretations of the events he has observed” (Becker, 1958, p. 652). 
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Requirements for written reports as communication of information 
Despite the availability of contemporary means, all interviewees preferred, from a practical point 
of view, written reports. Due to limited information technology capabilities on board written 
reports are preferable within a shipping company to transmit (safety) information to the ship. 
Written reports, they argue, can perpetuate the accident; a report prevents the data loss of an 
accident. At the same time, it is questionable though, if reports are indeed a good means to transfer 
knowledge, based on the perception that not organziations but people have memories and when 
they leave at the same time take their memories with them. (Kletz, 2002, p. 5). 
 
Written reports contain explicit knowledge. So, as to distribute qualitatively sound reports, the 
facilitator/investigator then has to take care that the processes that Nonaka called internalization 
and externalization (i.e., the conversion from data to tacit knowledge and then back from this tacit 
knowledge to an explicit report) proceed well. However, one difficulty in this conversion process 
is, according to Snowden (1999), that people know more than they can write. Converting tacit 
knowledge into written reports therefore results into a loss of meaning, a loss of content and in a 
loss of context. The facilitator needs to consider the focus of a safety investigation, and with that 
the (specific) internalization process resulting into a (specific) content and context of the 
externalization side.  
 
One issue that follows from the interviews is the importance of time saving incentives, i.e. the need 
for brief, reports in a clear language so that these can be read during one watch cycle. The need for 
time these saving incentives is supported by different scholars such as Lindberg (Lindberg et al, 
2010, p. 719), “a major reason for failure of dissemination may be that investigation reports are too 
long and not written in a sufficiently accessible language.” Bilingual reports are furthermore 
necessary in favor of inter-organizational learning, so that reports don’t have to be translated 
anymore as the crewmembers within the organization and same branch come from different 
countries.  
 
Speed of dissemination 
Fast accessibility of safety investigation reports shortly after an accident, this research points out, 
is also considered important. Following an accident, people want to know as soon as possible what 
is going on and if they are still safe, or which measures to implement to become safe again. 
However, effective accident prevention requires a thorough investigation. Safety investigators 
therefore focus on the underlying, often much less evident causes of an accident (Choularton, 
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2001). Scholars even concluded that summary reports emerging from investigations by shipping 
companies result into unreliable data with respect to indirect causes concerning an accident. Having 
the report quickly available can be counterproductive therefore for the quality of the safety 
information in the report. Companies should therefore not expect, that safety investigation 
information becomes available in a short period of time. Optionally as brought up by some 
interviewees, the facilitator could consider to bring speed in the process over thoroughness or work 
with intermediate reports. Another option is to follow the interest or focus of authorities, which 
give direction to safety investigation information so as to speed up the investigation process, and 
thus the dissemination of the investigation results. IMO and EASA, for example, proclaim topics 
to concentrate on, which are usable as a launching pad to predetermine the focus of the 
investigation. 
 
Anonymity vs confidentiality 
Trust was mentioned by the respondents in a similar manner as one of the main reasons responsible 
for being able to facilitate inter-organizational learning as it enables organizations to report 
occurrence without having to fear losing their face or being blamed. This results into an 
environment of inter-organizational learning according to Edmondson (2003). During the 
interviews, it became clear that losing face and/or mutual blaming hampers the organizations’ 
economical goals. Anonymity was the solution abetted by the majority of the interviewees to steer 
towards a just culture.  
 
Contrarily, as Dekker (2014) stipulates, anonymous reports are not the same as confidential reports. 
With anonymous occurrence reporting there is no possibility to ask for additional information 
because the contact details of the sender are unknown. This is not the case with confidential 
reporting as then these details are known by the safety or quality manager (Dekker, 2014, p. 20). 
This argues for an investigator or facilitator to work with confidential reports while protecting the 
anonymity of the reporter of the occurrence for the rest of the sector.  
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DISCUSSION 
 
This section aims to discuss topics for further research concerning inter-organizational learning in 
the maritime sector facilitated by a third party. Topics mentioned here are the limits, trustand 
credibility of the facilitator, the diversity of organizations, and culture differences. The section 
finishes with the limitations of this thesis and my own reflections. 
 
Topics for further research 
 
Limits of the facilitator 
The scope of this thesis was about the facilitation process and what incentives could enhance 
(inter-) organizational learning. This by focusing on the externalization side of the DIKW pyramid 
of the facilitator to support the internalization process of the sister-organziations. The 
internalization level of the facilitator is the determining factor to start the externalization phase. 
This in turn means that when the facilitator is stuck at a specific level in the pyramid, and probably 
missing a part in the internalization process, the externalization process is limited. It is of interest 
to conduct further research to discover latent limits of the facilitator which can potentially hamper 
the learning process.  
 
Trust in the and credibility of investigator/facilitator 
This, however, is just one means to establish trust. More research is necessary to study the 
connection between trust and the facilitation of inter-organizational learning by the dissemination 
of safety information. 
 
Also mentioned was the credibility of a facilitator, especially when this authority is also the safety 
investigation institute. Generally, the credibility of the authority is considered quite good. Even 
though the information provided is not always correct, still the credibility remains of high standard. 
This raises the questions whether the credibility is attached to the safety investigation authority, by 
the facilitator, or by a mix of the two. How this works, however, and how a facilitator can establish 
this credibility, is still a topic of study. 
 
Different organizations - different recommendations 
As a facilitator, the question could be raised on how the various types of recommendations from 
safety accident investigations fit with expected (safety) maturity levels of organizations and will be 
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accepted. The facilitator provides the whole branch at this time with the same safety investigation 
information and not organizations individually It seems reasonable though, to expect that 
organizations with less developed safety posture should not be approached in the same way as 
those with more mature mindset. Not much is known, however, whether this is indeed the case 
and whether this would improve the effectiveness of safety reports. More research is herefore 
necessary on this terrain. 
 
Addressing culture differences 
To achieve the goal of reducing the manning cost, shipping companies worldwide employ crews 
from countries where labour costs are low. The world merchant fleet is therefore for a large part 
manned by multicultural and multilingual crews. The results of the Baltic International Maritime 
Council & International chamber of Shipping Manpower Report (BIMCO/ISF) (n.d.) for the year 
2015 confirm that the largest seafarer supply countries are China, Indonesia, Philippines, Ukraine 
and the Russian Federation. This multicultural aspect is in line with results of this thesis. A large 
body of the interviewees reported that cultural differences hamper the learning from safety 
information, and thus also the learning from occurrences at sister-organizations. Also here, more 
research is necessary. 
 
Limitations of research 
I encountered during this thesis some limitations that have to be kept in mind when reading 
through the results. First, the choice of a small group of informants may affect the reliability of the 
data. I was disappointed about the limited positive reactions to my invitation to participate in this 
safety research, expecting that organizations would be interested in a subject like safety. This 
interest was expressed by most of the interviewees after the interview. 
 
I observed that most of the interviewees were hesitating to start the interview till I clarified that my 
research was not interwoven with my job as investigator, as information provided being used for 
investigations. Probably, this was a relief which resulted in a relaxed and open conversation. It 
made me aware that probably a personal invitation would have resulted in more volunteers.  
 
However, the question remains if this number of interviewees can represent the maritime sector. 
After my research, I can confirm that the number of rspondents was enough. This is based on 
repetitive answers. Especially, these on questions about safety learning and content of the safety 
investigation reports, and to a lesser extent about the triggers. The answers were that unambiguous 
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that they could be grouped relatively easy. For me, this research was explorative in nature and thus 
a starting point for other research.  
 
Second, about the way, the safety information is moving within the companies, the respondents 
described that the company is sending safety related information, including the information about 
occurrences in other organizations, to the ship. According to the interviewees, the distribution of 
safety information about occurrences in other organizations from their respective staffs to the ships 
all run according to what has been laid down in their safety management systems (SMS). Within 
the scope of this study was no room to really check this, but the respondents described at least no 
discrepancies. This is no surprise in itself, because the respondents are in control of or closely 
related to this part of the safety concept within their company.  
 
Studying one level only during this research was initiated not only due to limited time available for 
this study, but also because this level was the relay between the information facilitated and the rest 
of the organization. Future studies could for a better understanding be directed at the 
understanding of safety learning at different hierarchical levels. It could, for instance, reveal a 
possible gap between the sharp end and the blunt end understanding of safety learning and with 
that the difference how safety is achieved and understood.  
 
Third, I discovered during the research that, due to the different cultures participating within the 
maritime sector, it may be of interest to conduct a study for further development of culture in 
facilitating information, as anthropology in safety science.  
 
Finally, replicating the study may be hindered due to the lack of standardization as a criticism of 
qualitative research is that is it often affected by an unsystematically view and the researcher’s 
interpretation about what is important. However, this thesis intends to give further direction and 
initiates discussions around the effect of facilitating information within the safety arena to learn 
from, and not only within the maritime sector but also within other (transportation) sectors. 
 
Final reflections 
These last two years were an intensive and at the same time very interesting period compared to 
previous study moments. It was intensive because it absorbed much of my (social) time which 
reflected on my family; I adjusted my planning many times and finally threw it out of the window. 
This had also to do with the interesting (safety) topics, which crossed my path during my research. 
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I was eager and lured into reading as much as possible. Unfortunately, I had to frame my thinking 
and reading based on the research question.  
 
Also interesting were the interviews and discussions with the interviewees. All of them were 
intrigued by the questions that sounded simple initially but ended up with mind provoking ideas 
and thoughts. It hit me that an investigation board, at least in the Netherlands, did not maintain 
discussions like that on regular base. During this research, I started conversations with safety 
representatives of different companies and was even invited for a few meetings. At the same time, 
I argued for participative observation and conducted this way of investigation three times the last 
year. This resulted in a mutual understanding and respect that was a way of accepting safety 
investigation information by the organization involved in an accident itself, but also other 
organizations. 
 
This thesis broadened my thinking of safety and instigated the interest of supporting companies in 
approaching safety. Learning others by still learning by myself. (Inter-organizational) learning from 
facilitated safety information is not compulsory, but neither is survival!  
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CONCLUSION 
 
Based on the results of the semi-structured interviews the conclusion is that incentives exist that 
facilitators can use in the aftermath of a maritime occurrence. These incentives regard the 
dissemination of safety investigation information such that it improves or causes a lower threshold 
for inter-organizational learning. The results have both theoretical and pragmatic implications. 
 
This thesis provides isights from a domain that seems largely unexplored and therefore will add to 
the academic literature. Also, by identifying incentives for inter-organizational learning across 
organizations, the thesis can be used by facilitators in how to improve the communication of their 
safety investigation information so as to enhance inter-organizational learning and thus to improve 
safety across organizations.  
 
Learning has been argued to be important in accident prevention (Dekker, 2014; Lindberg et al, 
2010; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). Safety investigation boards struggle, however, with how to 
disseminate their products – safety information about occurrences – such that it facilitates inter-
organizational learning. In this research, some pragmatic incentives have been mentioned, such as 
the wish to continue the dissemination of written reports, only to be accompanied by other 
contemporary means. These reports should, above all, include an abstract and context, and should, 
to facilitate and stimulate the reading of these reports, be bilingual, brief and positively formulated. 
Also, is it assumable that, due to the different cultures within the different (sister-) organizations, 
different ways of information facilitation are required. Considered important furthermore, is to 
ensure anonymity, which could, for instance, be protected by an umbrella-organization that 
stimulates safety meetings and workshops. The latter can also be provided by the facilitator itself. 
 
Organizations face similar but different issues. They fear commercial threats after having been the 
victim of an accident as this may damage their reputation, which may cause a less open attitude 
about safety issues. This could perhaps be counteracted by using a positive approach. This can be 
acted upon by investigating why things normally go right and make it happen again to improve 
safety. Other examples are the herefore mentioned anonymity and provider of safety meetings, and 
participative observation by the investigator, or visiting organizations to discuss safety (items).  
 
Other ingredients to facilitate the use of safety information by sister-organizations have been 
mentioned in this research. One more important aspect brought to the fore though was the 
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credibility of an investigation board. Especially as what independent national investigation 
authorities publish is often be considered as true, this brings a responsibility for the authority to be 
credible. Only then will the authority gain and maintain trust. One example through which 
credibility can be gained is to apply participative observations during the investigation so that the 
investigator can learn from the organization how the work is done in a very natural way. At the 
same time, participative observation can counter the safety paradox which exist between Old and 
New View of safety thinking. 
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Appendix A: Invitation
 
Wie ben ik?
Ik ben werkzaam bij de Onderzoeksraad voor 
Veiligheid. Mijn passie voor veiligheid heeft 
mij vorig jaar doen besluiten de masterop-
leiding “Human Factors & System Safety” te 
gaan volgen in Lund, Zweden. Deze opleiding 
wordt afgesloten met een scriptie. 
Wanneer vindt het interview plaats?
Het interview zal in de periode september of 
oktober 2016 plaatsvinden. Het zal gemiddeld 
60 minuten duren en kan tot 90 minuten 
uitlopen.
Wie zoek ik?
- U dient bekend te zijn met de website van 
de Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid.
- U heeft een veiligheidsfunctie binnen uw 
organisatie.
- U dient beschikbaar te zijn in de maand 
september of oktober.
- U bent bereid uw veiligheidsperspectief 
te delen en daar een open dialoog over te 
voeren.
André Roskam | mfs15aro@student.lu.se | (+31)6 30 11 32 67
Hoe meldt u zich aan?
Mail voor zaterdag 13 augustus naar 
mfs15aro@student.lu.se. Vermeld dan uw 
naam, uw functie en het telefoonnummer 
waarop ik u tijdens kantooruren kan bereiken. 
Als u meer informatie wilt, kunt mailen naar 
dit adres. Ik neem dan zo spoedig mogelijk 
contact met u op. 
About MSc Human Factors & 
System Safety
This MSc is to expand knowledge 
and practical skills for the safety 
challenges of the twenty-ﬁ rst century. 
Its program offers the latest thinking 
in the new view of human factors, 
accountability, accident models, 
and resilience engineering. The 
understanding of accidents, risk and 
safety is changing. We no longer 
see human error as cause, but as a 
symptom. We recognize the exciting 
possibilities of systems thinking for 
accident analysis and organizational 
improvement. We are shifting from 
reliability to resilience and the enhan-
cement of adaptive capacity. We look 
for new relation- ships between stake-
holders to create forms of accounta-
bility that do not harm safety.
Uitnodiging voor deelname aan een interview 
Onderzoek naar veiligheidsmotivering
© RBN
Waarom dit interview?
Mijn thesis gaat over de uiteindelijke infor-
matie die beschikbaar is aan het einde 
van een veiligheidsonderzoek. Deze infor-
matie wordt zo verwerkt in rapporten en 
beschikbaar gesteld, met het doel voorvallen 
in de toekomst te voorkomen. Dit impliceert 
dat de beschikbaar gestelde informatie tot 
veiligheidsverbetering leidt. En dit niet alleen 
voor organisaties die betrokken zijn geweest 
bij een voorval, maar vooral ook voor de 
‘collega-organisaties’. Wordt inter-organisa-
torische veiligheidsmotivatie inderdaad geïni-
tieerd door die informatie? 
Doel van dit interview?
Dit interview tracht te achterhalen aan welke 
factoren de informatie dient te voldoen, wil 
een andere organisatie daarvan leren. Hoe 
kan informatie op de juiste manier gedeeld 
worden? Hoe leert uw organisatie daarvan? 
Kan een onderzoeksinstantie hier rekening 
mee houden, en hoe?
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Appendix B: The informed consent 
Appendix B consists of the informed consent form written in English. The interviewer explained 
the context before the interview itself in Dutch language as the primary language. Before 
commencing the interview this form was signed and collected by the interviewer. 
 
Consent for Participation in a Research Project 
Lund University, Human Factors and Systems Safety 
 
“Improving safety investigation information facilitation in order to enhance 
inter-organizational learning.” 
(André) K. Roskam 
 
I am a student at the University of Lund, in the Department of Human Factors and Systems Safety. I am 
planning to conduct a research study, which I invite you to take part in. This form has important information 
about the reason for doing this study, what I will ask you to do if you decide to be in this study, and the way 
we will use your information if you choose to be in the study.  
 
Purpose: 
You are being asked to participate in a study about inter-organizational learning and the way how this can 
be affecting safety investigation information distribution. I hope to learn from this study which aspects are 
involved when inter-organizational learning takes place, more specifically when and how an organization 
learns from another organization that has been subject of a safety investigation. Finally, what I hope to get 
out of this study is some insights how these aspects can be used to communicate and formulate safety 
investigation information that supports inter-organizational learning?  
 
Procedures: 
Participation in this study will involve an interview. I anticipate that your involvement will require one 
session of maximum 1.5 hours, and the meeting location will be determined to your preference. You will be 
asked questions regarding how you perceive (inter-organizational) learning generally, whether this improves 
organizational safety and which aspects, in your opinion, have to be involved to pursue this inter-
organizational learning.  
 
I would like to audio-record this interview to make sure that I review accurately all the information you 
provide. I will transcribe the interview of which a copy will be provided to you. You have the right to review 
and edit the transcript. The recordings will be kept in my home office in a locked cabinet and then digitally 
in a password-locked and encrypted computer and this will only be used by me. The information will be 
stored for five years after completion of the research for research transparency reasons and subsequently 
destroyed.  
 
I may quote your remarks in presentations or articles resulting from this work. I will process the data in 
such a way that it is not traced back to you as the informant in order to respect your privacy, unless you 
specifically request that you be identified by your true name.  
 
 
Student Supervisor Assessor 
André Roskam Gwen Bakx Johan Bergström 
Hertog Reinoudsingel 127   
5913 XC Venlo   
0630113267   
mfs15aro@student.lu.se   
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Additional information is available at http://www.codex.vr.se/en/index.shtml  
 
Agreement to Participate: 
I have read this form and the research study has been explained to me. I have been given the 
opportunity to ask questions and my questions have been answered. If I have additional questions, 
I have been told whom to contact. I agree to participate in the research study described above and 
I have been given a copy of this consent form. 
 
 
 
 
______________________________________________________  
Participant’s Name (printed)     
    
 
 
 
______________________________________________________ ________________  
Participant’s Signature     Date  
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Appendix C: The interview guide  
Appendix C consists of the interview guide used in the thesis, to reveal the empirical results. The 
guide is written in English; however, the interviews were conducted in Dutch as the interviewer 
and interviewees primary language.  
 
Background: 
-   Briefly describe your work, tasks and responsibilities.  
-   How does the organigram look like? 
-   How long does your organization exist?  
-   What is the experience of your organization?  
 
Incident follow-up: 
-   Can you remember a particular occurrence, incident or accident involving a colleague 
(organization)?  
-   What was YOUR organization’s reaction?  
-   Did your organization learn from this occurrence and how?  
 
Safety inter-organizational learning incentives:  
-   What were incentives for your organization to learn from the previous mentioned occurrence?  
-   What other incentives could have increased the urge to learn from this incident in the colleague 
organization?  
-   If the safety board would follow the results of this study, would your organization then be 
more inclined to learn from incidents in other organizations? Why? 
 
General ideas:  
-   Does your organization learn from the safety investigation information concerning an accident 
in a colleague organization?  
-   Is this comparable to learning from other organizations 
-   How is the static safety investigation information distributed within the organization? 
-   How is this static distributed information distributed dynamically within the organization?   
-   Is it possible to learn from other organizations to your opinion? How? 
 
Is there anything to add regarding the topic of learning from safety reports on incidents in colleague 
organizations that has not had sufficient attention during this interview?  
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Appendix D: The interview results  
Appendix D is a summarizing of the answers from the interviewees. After performing eight semi-
structured interviews with nine employees from eight different ship-owner companies the 
following results are provided. Each chapter starts with a short introduction to the interviewee.  
 
D1. Interviewee 1 
D.1.1 Introduction to the interviewee 
Interviewee 1 graduated from nautical college and sailed onboard starting as third officer and 
finished as captain during the last four years of sailing. He was asked to fulfill the billet of safety 
environment affairs manager within the same ship-owner company, followed by quality and human 
resource manager and roughly three years as manager competence and training. At the moment, 
he is a Health, Safety and Environment (HSE) manager.  He is responsible for the internal auditing, 
creating policy and conducting accident investigations, including monitoring the recommendations. 
 
D1.2 Introduction to company 
The company has 21 chemical and product tankers. Most of these ships are sailing under 
Norwegian flag, four under Singapore flag. All crew members have Filipino nationality. The 
company has a direction level, management and ships. 
 
D1.3 Results interviewing person 1 
Categories Interviewee 1 
Remembrance of an accident involving a 
colleague-organization  
•   Receiving information from oil and chemical 
party 
•   Receiving information from P&I club 
•   Receiving information by newsletter 
•   Bomariner, ten years ago 
•   Accidents concerning palmoil 
•   Accidents seen on Youtube 
Reaction to this accident •   Can happen to us too 
•   Checking procedures 
•   Safety campaign with posters 
•   Dividing information in newsletters based on 
similarity with own company 
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How did you learn from this occurrence?  •   Trying to change culture and thinking of crew 
members 
•   Only attention when big accident happens 
•   Did not learn because of other priorities 
•   Asking how did it happen and can this happen 
to us too 
Definition of (safety) learning  •   Reading what is written 
•   Explain and demonstrate 
•   Changing culture on the long run  
•   Eliminating raid pace 
•   Taking care of different cultures  
The incentives to learn from mentioned 
occurrence 
•   The volume of the accident 
•   Relation with own experience 
•   Relation with own interest 
•   Issues which have attention and are discussed 
(ECDIS, IMO regulation) 
•   Receiving more and fast information of 
accident 
•   Based on public opinion 
•   A sudden accident in slow period 
What other incentives can you think of to 
increase the urge of learning? 
•   Connecting using ship-owners society 
•   Easy access to information 
•   Money 
•   Inter-organizational communication 
•   Visualization (DVD’s on board, movies, 
slightly shocking pictures, AIS on Youtube) 
•   Investigation reports in English language 
•   Summary  
•   Title of report 
•   Recommendations (not always necessary) 
Is it possible that your organization can 
learn from other organizations?  
•   Yes, due to reporting culture within the oil 
and chemical branch  
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•   Yes, due to information distribution within 
the branch  
How is static safety information 
distribution conducted?  
•   Distribution from office to management on 
board  
•   Safety meeting IAW SMS on board  
How is the dynamic safety information 
distribution conducted?  
•   Ship dependent due to culture difference on 
board (young Filipines act differently 
compared to older colleagues)  
•   Difficult to determine, only based on ship 
visits on board and received investigation 
reports 
Remarks  •   Nice conversation also because looking at 
safety in a different way  
•   Normally no time to think or talk about safety 
due to time constraints. One of the reasons is 
the growth of the company from 13 to 21 
ships in three years   
 
 
D2. Interviewee 2 
D.2.1 Introduction to the interviewee  
Interviewee 2 has been working in de maritime industry for almost twenty years and has sailed on 
board ships concerning maritime transport as first officer. The last ten years are spent in an office. 
At the moment, the interviewee is the Quality, Health, Safety, Security and Environment (QHSSE) 
manager within the company that started in 2013, and busy with writing and implementing a safety 
management system (SMS). Interviewee acted one year as instructor at a maritime school.  
 
D.2.2 Introduction to company 
The company is in possession of four modern ships which are managed by an external party for 
global maritime transport. The ships were self-designed in cooperation with a ship building 
company. The fleet will be extended with two other ships. The crew members have the Ukraine 
and Filipino nationality. The company is small and has one management level only.  
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D.2.3 Results interviewing person 2 
Categories Interviewee 2 
Remembrance of an accident involving a 
colleague-organization  
•   Hatch cover crane accidents which 
happened regularly  
Reaction to this accident •   Not much, monitoring the results by the 
inspectorate and ports state control  
How did you learn from this occurrence?  •   Not much, it confirmed the feeling that 
hatch cover cranes create a dangerous 
working environment  
•   I conducted a scan on board and the results 
will be implemented 
Definition of (safety) learning  •   Using incidents and near-misses to change 
thinking and attitude of crew members 
step by step  
•   Visiting the ships, listen to and advise crew 
members and return to make sure they 
understood  
•   Motivation, teaching and testing  
The incentives to learn from mentioned 
occurrence 
•   Own interested which started at nautical 
college when one of his peers died during 
an accident on board with a welding 
machine. This was truly striking  
•   Hobbyhorse or tic, due to own experience  
What other incentives can you think of to 
increase the urge of learning? 
•   Observe actively on board ships  
•   Distinguished technical investigation and 
anonymized personnel impact  
•   Give victims possibility to tell their story  
•   Focusing on themes  
•   Clear language  
•   Visualization using pictures or movies in 
line with ‘seconds from disaster’ or ‘air 
crash investigation’ 
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•   Statistics  
Is it possible that your organization can learn 
from other organizations?  
•   Organizations are not willing to distribute 
incident information causing record 
damage   
•   No, there is no communication with other 
companies  
•   Only by reading investigation reports  
How is static safety information distribution 
conducted?  
•   Up and down the organization IAW SMS 
•   Safety committee on board 
•   Safety observation cards once a month to 
meet performance criteria  
How is the dynamic safety information 
distribution conducted?  
•   Not clear, but during holiday observing 
Indonesian people work makes me 
understand that sailing on board a high 
safety standard ship and presence of books 
which are difficult to read or not 
understandable, makes life difficult  
•   Planning to place an IPad onboard with a 
sailor version; hopefully will this increase 
safety attitude  
Remarks  •   Interesting conversation with somebody 
from the safety world and that keeps me 
thinking  
•   Conventional crew members who are 
sailing for 20 or 30 years are now 
confronted with regulations. Most of the 
time these are demanded by the customers. 
It is my responsibility to close that gap 
between regulations and how to deal with 
it practically. That is an ongoing process  
•   Investigation reports are considered true 
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D3. Interviewee 3 
D.3.1 Introduction to the interviewee  
Interviewee 3 is the Quality, Health, Safety and Environment (QHSE) manager within the 
company, and principally advising an supporting line management to preform safely.  
 
D.3.2 Introduction to company 
The seventy years old family company is in possession of ten ships and specialized in heavy-lift 
tasks, moving big objects. The company has a direction level with staff department, a management 
level and employee level on board of the ships.  
 
D.3.3 Results interviewing person 3 
Categories Interviewee 3 
Remembrance of an accident involving a 
colleague-organization  
•   No  
Reaction to this accident •   Not applicable, but normally information 
is received from oil and gas industry 
clustered by theme. If comparison is 
available, then it will be communicated 
within the company on board of the ships   
How did you learn from this occurrence?  •   Left to the crew members on board by 
distributing information and follow SMS 
communication line (safety committee, 
crew members will take precautions)  
Definition of (safety) learning  •   Sharing investigation reports  
•   Transparency concerning good and bad 
things  
•   Training and explaining why we do things  
•   Attitude is the condition for the safety 
perspective on board  
•   Safety thinking is busy with management 
system, risk assessments, reporting, etc  
The incentives to learn from mentioned 
occurrence 
•   Information from oil and gas industry  
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What other incentives can you think of to 
increase the urge of learning? 
•   Clear description of accident 
•   Anonymous 
•   Cartoons 
•   Pictures  
•   Make it possible that people can relive the 
accident within context 
•   Not a lot of pages in a report  
•   Easy language  
•   Correct terminology  
•   Complete package from the one who 
wrote the report in such a way that it can 
be distributed directly  
•   Statistics involving the company itself to 
find out her status in comparison to other 
companies  
Is it possible that your organization can learn 
from other organizations?  
•   Organizations are not willing to distribute 
incident information due to competition 
and causing record damage  
•   Only possibility is something like IMCA, 
that collects information, makes it 
anonymous and distributes it again within 
the branch  
•   Or as KVNR using a database; at the end 
did it not work either; reporting was 
necessary, and the companies which 
reported everything were seen as unsafe 
while they were the safest  
•   KNVR should act and be used as 
discussion platform  
•   As long as blame culture continue to exist, 
there will not be voluntary incident 
reporting  
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How is static safety information distribution 
conducted?  
•   Safety committee on board with feedback 
reporting   
How is the dynamic safety information 
distribution conducted?  
•   Monthly discussion with captains  
•   Semi-annual discussion with safety officers 
and chief engineers 
Remarks  •   Interesting conversation with somebody 
from the safety world and that keeps me 
thinking  
•   Conventional, older crew members who 
are sailing for years is not used to the way 
of safety thinking as the younger 
generation. Older crew members are from 
the era skipper next to God. Having 
internal discussion how to get control of 
people to look at safety all the same  
•   Companies keep list of the number of PSC 
visits to use as competition means with 
customers  
 
 
D4. Interviewee 4 
D.4.1 Introduction to the interviewee  
Interviewee 4 is the Health, Safety, Environment and Quality (HSEQ) manager and with the 
members of the department responsible for safety and quality to keep the ships safe and are able 
to continue sailing. This means certified for ISM and ISPS. Every year all ships are visited IAW 
audit schedule.  
 
D.4.2 Introduction to company 
The more than hundred years old family company is in possession of 66 ships. It is certified for 
ISO 9001; some ships are ISO 14001 certified if the customer requires. The company has a 
direction level with staff department, a management level and employee level on board of the ships; 
manned by about 1900 people. Next, there are a little more than hundred ships which are managed 
by a captain-owner. These captain-owners are responsible for their own safety and quality, the 
cargo load is arranged by the company.  
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D.4.3 Results interviewing person 4 
Categories Interviewee 4 
Remembrance of an accident involving a 
colleague-organization  
•   Lady Irina, enclosed space entry  
•   Snap back zones on board, breaking of 
ropes  
Reaction to this accident •   Accident communicated with ships of 
company by using Fleet News  
•   Fleet News also distributed on board the 
ships of captain-owners, also to show 
company safety thinking  
•   Share information on an independent 
intranet  
•   One-on-one recommendations were taken 
over  
•   New procedure implemented on board, 
audit for follow-up, sanctions if not 
implemented or followed  
•   Direction level shows attention for other 
accidents and reports  
How did you learn from this occurrence?  •   Could happen on board of own ships too; 
be prepared and compare the incident with 
own situation on board  
•   Marked snap back zones, which created 
fake safety feeling, were replaced by one 
marking ‘danger zone’ when entering the 
mooring deck  
Definition of (safety) learning  •   Recognizing dangerous situations before 
becoming an accident  
•   Attitude change based on procedures that 
find the origin in accidents  
The incentives to learn from mentioned 
occurrence 
•   Comparable accident on board comparable 
ships  
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•   In line with own focus on incidents within 
the company  
•   In line with the focus of the branch  
•   Comparable with same procedures  
•   Company was under observation by 
inspectorate, which caused a motivation to 
proof customers and authorities otherwise. 
So, keeping track of all possible risks of 
other accident investigation reports was in 
line with SMS to monitor own company 
risks  
What other incentives can you think of to 
increase the urge of learning? 
•   Use KVNR as communication platform  
•   More attention for smaller accidents that 
are more important than big accidents  
•   Not only accidents but all incidents 
•   Transparency and openness  
•   General database with all reported 
incidents owned by one to find causes  
•   Anonymous  
Is it possible that your organization can learn 
from other organizations?  
•   This is possible but difficult. My company 
is divided into ‘island culture’; an incident 
can hurt the whole company and not only 
one department  
•   Yes, but ‘what is in it for me?’ We are 
getting better, also as competitors, because 
accidents will not make us better 
performing within the branch  
•   At the moment, this does not work 
because after every accident the 
inspectorate jumps on the situation which 
forces companies to act upon expectations 
and cost a lot of money  
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How is static safety information distribution 
conducted?  
•   IAW SMS, from office to ship and 
discussed in safety meeting  
How is the dynamic safety information 
distribution conducted?  
•   Not really only when on board for an audit  
•   The way incident reports are closed based 
on incomplete information or copy-paste 
from other reports, gives an idea  
•   Compared to a few years ago, the lower 
ranks on board are assertive enough to 
question staff members; so, people are 
growing concerning safety thinking  
•   Crew members of ships with Dutch or 
Eastern crew are questioning staff 
members on board indicating that 
something positive happens concerning 
safety thinking and attitude. This is 
something different on ships with Ukraine 
or Russia crew (are not loyal either)  
•   This difference in attitude is also 
observable during the different yearly 
officer meetings with staff  
•   Motivation of personnel  
Remarks  •   People will not learn, examples as holding 
a fire door open day and night; people in 
the office used to sail too and they are 
(also) blind for some risks or dangers in 
working environment  
•   Russian crew members are always available 
and cheap  
•   Russians do not trust the government; I am 
Polish too and recognize that attitude  
•   Showing personal interest creates a 
bonding to get closer to a person and 
understand him  
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•   Paris MOU international ranking vs 
national inspections and safety 
improvement with older ships and willing 
crew members; inspections are not directly 
related to safety  
 
 
D5. Interviewee 5 
C.5.1 Introduction to the interviewee  
Interviewee 5 is responsible for the cooperate Health, Safety, Environment and Quality (HSEQ). 
The interviewee has fulfilled many jobs within the company and therefore very familiar with the 
working environment. The interviewee is responsible for elevating the less performing companies 
and boost their cooperation to enhance learning between those companies.  
 
D.5.2 Introduction to company 
The company established 118 years ago. Originally, a maritime company and over the years the 
company has extended by recruiting and establishing other companies. At the moment, the 
company has about 3200 employees and seven departments. The company has a direction level 
with staff department, a middle management level and employee level on board of the ships. So, 
generally there are three levels, some companies have four levels.  
 
D.5.3 Results interviewing person 5 
Categories Interviewee 5 
Remembrance of an accident involving a 
colleague-organization  
•   Yes, many times 
•   Small messages via IMCA, offshore branch 
•   Incident in Germany, a crane in contact 
with electric railway cable  
Reaction to this accident •   High potential messages are shared 
•   Safety bulletin or safety alert 
•   Direction level hesitates to inform and 
share information; proud or code of honor 
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•   If investigation is conducted by third party, 
company will not do the same; company 
waits for results of that investigation 
How did you learn from this occurrence?  •   Compared with own situation  
Definition of (safety) learning  •   Getting better by using the positive and 
negative experience 
•   Sharing, even if it influences your position 
on the market as happens within the oil and 
gas branch 
The incentives to learn from mentioned 
occurrence 
•   Anonymous 
•   Comparable situation or activities 
What other incentives can you think of to 
increase the urge of learning? 
•   Title of investigation (report) 
•   Context 
•   Summary including keywords 
•   Which third party conducted investigation? 
Safety board is seen as a trustworthy party 
•   Easy accessible online 
Is it possible that your organization can learn 
from other organizations?  
•   Yes, is possible 
•   Within maritime branch difficult; has to do 
with culture (Dutch, Russian, Ukraine, 
Asian)  
•   Within oil and gas branch even 
competitors receive results of safety 
investigations 
•   Proud is in the way; dirty washing is 
laundered at home 
•   Independent reporting is not possible on 
board; everything goes via captain or first 
officer 
•   Safety mature companies can even learn 
from safety investigation reports 
concerning aviation accidents 
 
 
74 
How is static safety information distribution 
conducted?  
•   Safety alert and fleet news 
•   SMS 
•   Safety meeting 
How is the dynamic safety information 
distribution conducted?  
•   Difficult to find out; the company gives the 
captain the key of a twenty-million-euro 
ship and request him to establish contact 
frequently 
•   Difficult; one-on-one with ratings 
preferred but the company does not want 
to undermine the captain  
Remarks  •   Less safety performing companies 
measured by the number of reported 
incidents, undesired actions on working 
floor and results of baseline measurement 
•   Safety mature companies have more and 
dedicated resources to read reports and 
learn from it 
•   If results of own report are not the same as 
third party report it depends on team 
construction, not the investigation 
method; every method should lead to the 
same conclusion 
•   Internet on board of ships makes 
communication easier, though contact is 
still going via captain or first officer 
•   Office members have to sail on board a 
ship to encounter the situation 
 
 
D6. Interviewee 6 
D.6.1 Introduction to the interviewee  
Interviewee 6 has been working in the department of Health, Quality, Safety and Environment 
(HQSE). Before, the interviewee worked for the Navy followed as marine lead auditor concerning 
ISO standardization and finally as auditor at Lloyds Register.  
 
 
75 
D.6.2 Introduction to company 
The twenty-year-old company started as container company. About four years ago, general purpose 
ships were included. Since 2011 crew tender vessels have been co-opted. The company has a 
direction level with staff department, a management level with the heads of department and the 
working level. Shortly, the company arranges everything except the freighting.  
 
D.6.3 Results interviewing person 6 
Categories Interviewee 6 
Remembrance of an accident involving a 
colleague-organization  
•   Yes, not by name 
•   Flinterstar 
•   Enclose space entry 
•   Sinking of car carrier near Rotterdam 
•   Fishership guardship collision 
•   Man over board while unleashing 
containers on Humber river 
Reaction to this accident •   Waiting for results of investigation 
•   Not much, due to limited information 
•   Attention by IMO, MAIB and other third 
parties 
•   Recognizable circumstances concerning, 
crew, ship or company otherwise no 
attention, although very interesting 
•   Inform ships and stimulate to do 
something with it 
How did you learn from this occurrence?  •   Only when report is published 
•   Not much time to read, but you can 
mention the report and hopefully crew 
members are going to read it 
Definition of (safety) learning  •   Using experience to change to prevent 
things from happening again 
The incentives to learn from mentioned 
occurrence 
•   Other parties are interested, so something 
is going on  
•   Recognizable situations 
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•   Can happen to us too 
What other incentives can you think of to 
increase the urge of learning? 
•   Easy readable report; so it can be read 
during a watch period 
•   Depending on the different types of 
people. There are people who can read and 
remember, there are people who do not 
read; perhaps use pictures 
•   Some persons have to be convinced with 
arguments, some people just follow orders 
•   Report written in simple or approachable 
language 
•   Question reader; could this happen to you? 
Questions in the report itself. 
•   Financially 
•   Detention 
•   Regulations to force to think about 
implementation 
•   Observe the occurrence from different 
angels, also the small incidents 
Is it possible that your organization can learn 
from other organizations?  
•   Slow process du to frequently changing 
crew, only three times a year conducting a 
visit on board, hopefully both captains will 
discuss during handover 
•   The business is reactive, as long as it going 
well there is no issue 
•   No, there is no time left due to the many 
regulations to think about own company 
•   There is no openness; if no investigation is 
conducted the company is happy; to 
prevent naming and shaming; Wagenborg 
safety culture investigation is good to learn 
from, but is killing for the investigated 
company  
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•   Only when all crew members are able to 
report an incident; now not possible due to 
no access of internet by crew 
How is static safety information distribution 
conducted?  
•   Via internet 
•   During visits on board 
•   Safety meeting 
•   Uploading in internet system including 
summary 
How is the dynamic safety information 
distribution conducted?  
•   Supporting decisions of the captain 
although against commercial requests; also 
to prevent that the captain will not return 
to work for company; from there safety 
culture is built  
•   Personnel contact by telephone to discuss 
items to make captain personally interested 
before distributing 
•   Asking during visit what the office is doing 
good and not so good; dyslectic personnel 
on board do not read reports 
•   Results of working group sailors; usage of 
a beam with traffic light colors to question 
crew members about safety on board 
Remarks  •   It is not about the investigating party, it is 
about the content of the report 
•   For the company, it is easier to transfer 
written reports instead of movies due to 
the many Mb’s 
•   Report in depth is of more value; 
experience with a third-party investigation 
was not positive 
•   Safety culture investigation was the start of 
a workgroup sailors to improve 
performance 
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D7. Interviewee 7 
D.7.1 Introduction to the interviewee  
Interviewee 7 is director fleet operations Europe and primary the representative for the company, 
and therefore maintaining contacts with inspectorate, police, defence, coast guard and other 
authorities. The interviewee makes it possible that the ships are certified and can sail. the Health, 
Safety, Environment and Quality (HSEQ) manager and with the members of the department 
responsible for safety and quality to keep the ships safe and are qble to continue sailing. This means 
certified for ISM and ISPS. Every year all ships are visited IAW audit schedule.  
 
D.7.2 Introduction to company 
The company is established in 1873 and is part of a cooperation of nine companies worldwide, and 
possesses fourteen ships. Two years ago, the companied grouped together with three other 
companies within the cooperation. This group employs about seventy thousand persons and 
possesses thirty-nine ships sailing under Dutch, Bahama, Bermuda and English flags. The offices 
are all positioned in America. The company has a CEO level, brand presidents with senior 
executive vice-presidents level, senior vice-presidents level, management level and finally the 
workfloor.  
 
D.7.3 Results interviewing person 7 
Categories Interviewee 7 
Remembrance of an accident involving a 
colleague-organization  
•   Falling rescue craft killing two people at a 
sister company 
Reaction to this accident •   Checking own rescue craft construction 
•   Two fast rescue crafts temporarily non-
active 
How did you learn from this occurrence?  •   Checking construction 
•   Finding root cause 
Definition of (safety) learning  •   Find a root cause to an incident 
•   Easy when technical failure 
•   Something else when human failure; spit 
deeper to find a cause 
•   Question remains if procedures are good 
enough; unknown if not followed 
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•   Culture change; starts with the 
introduction when recruited for company 
The incentives to learn from mentioned 
occurrence 
•   Publicity 
•   Can happen in our company too, the ships 
are al built at the same building company 
•   Information quickly available, small 
branch/world 
•   Same procedures 
•   Same SMS within company and on board 
What other incentives can you think of to 
increase the urge of learning? 
•   More incidents collected in one report 
•   Make it clear that reporting does not have 
to lead to blame and shame 
•   Report title 
•   Thoroughness of report, especially the 
human factor  
•   Investigators have to have credits from the 
maritime sector; they need to know what 
they are talking about 
•   According to my experience, the content is 
correct 
Is it possible that your organization can learn 
from other organizations?  
•   Yes, because our branch is very transparent 
•   Further outside the branch via the 
international institute CLIA 
•   On the other side, CEO’s do not want to 
see an accident as Costa Concordia in their 
company. This has changed the whole 
branch concerning training and ship 
building 
•   Depending how open to this method 
How is static safety information distribution 
conducted?  
•   Senior management conferences 
•   Communication between ship and shore 
always via captain 
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•   Toolbox discussions 
How is the dynamic safety information 
distribution conducted?  
•   During coffeebreak ‘pikheet’  
•   I have an informal meeting during 
upcoming lunch 
Remarks  •   The nationality on board is decided by the 
expectations of customers; i.e. Dutch 
flagged ship with Dutch officers decides 
image of company 
•   We always liked to read the verdicts of the 
maritime board of justice; this was the only 
source of information; nowadays there is 
more media available; also because the 
board did not understand the context 
 
 
D8. Interviewees 8a and 8b 
D.8.1 Introduction to the interviewees  
Interviewee 8a is the Quality, Health, Safety and Environment (HQSE) officer.  
 
Interviewee 8b is the corporate QHSE manager, maintaining the helicopter view, and fulfilling this 
job since November 2015. 
 
D.8.2 Introduction to company 
The company is established in the fifties, sixties. Mainly, it is operating abroad in possession of 
eight ships. Roughly 80 persons are employed, including office and on board. A recent 
reorganization changed from local only to world-wide only. The company is working with four 
levels, the board, senior management, middle managers and finally the working floor; and local 
operations managers abroad at every location. 
 
D.8.3 Results interviewing persons 8a and 8b 
Categories Interviewees 8a and 8b 
Remembrance of an accident involving a 
colleague-organization  
•   Recent fatal accident on board ISV [Infield 
Support Vessel] in Brasil; received by 
coincidence from colleague 
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•   Incidents mentioned in the ROS 
•   Incidents from a joint venture with 
Australian company 
•   Paper gCaptain 
Reaction to this accident •   Acknowledgment by own company, no 
reaction only that something like that can 
happen and should not happen within own 
company 
•   Informal meeting with operational level; 
no communication with higher levels 
How did you learn from this occurrence?  •   We did not learn, we acknowledged the 
information  
Definition of (safety) learning  •   Using PDCA-circle, producing reports, 
improving to become safer as organization 
or more efficient 
•   Learning from mistakes 
•   Improving performance is recognized by 
decreasing numbers, better numbers 
•   Content personnel 
•   Awareness, leaders as example 
•   Innovation, as other part of learning 
•   Attitude change 
•   Intrinsic motivation  
The incentives to learn from mentioned 
occurrence 
•   Same tasks conducted by ships 
•   Recognize similarities 
•   Not mature enough to recognize other 
triggers 
What other incentives can you think of to 
increase the urge of learning? 
•   Continuously interaction with people 
•   Being part of what we are 
•   Accountabilities as interpreted by judges 
•   Not only focus on wrong issues which 
causes safety to decrease; focus on other 
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methods to deal with issues to prevent 
negative outcomes 
•   Reports written by experts of a safety 
investigation board 
•   Report title 
•   Pictures with challenging captions 
•   Sometimes only context is necessary, 
translation is done within company itself 
•   Summary 
•   Free of subjectivity or suggestions 
•   Different perspectives 
Is it possible that your organization can learn 
from other organizations?  
•   No, name and blame; if an inspectorate is 
visiting not everything is told 
•   Yes, informal meetings world-wide 
How is static safety information distribution 
conducted?  
•   Safety flash 
•   Uploading information in manage resource 
management accessible on board; no 
feedback received 
•   SMS explains also feedback to office 
•   Monthly reports are sent to senior 
management level 
How is the dynamic safety information 
distribution conducted?  
•   Difficult to determine; the office inform 
the ships and that’s it 
•   There are ships which report executed 
drills as perfect; that is suspicious 
•   Depends on the different cultures on 
board; Dutch crew is trusted in 
comparison to Asian crew concerning 
focus on safety 
Remarks  •   Company is not yet mature concerning 
giving attention to different incidents and 
announcing these internally 
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•   Abroad the company has to contract local 
sailors 
•   Different cultures need different 
approaches 
•   Written reports are the easiest way to 
distribute information 
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Appendix E: The interview results separated into categories 
Appendix E is a gathering of the results provided from appendix C into categories.  
 
E.1 Remembrance of an accident involving a colleague-organization 
The first category is related to the remembrance of an accident involving a colleague-organization.  
Interviewee Answers 
1 •   Receiving information from oil and chemical party 
•   Receiving information from P&I club 
•   Receiving information by newsletter 
•   Bomariner, ten years ago 
•   Accidents concerning palmoil 
•   Accidents seen on Youtube 
2 •   Hatch cover crane accidents which happened regularly 
3 •   No 
4 •   Lady Irina, enclosed space entry  
•   Snap back zones on board, breaking of ropes 
5 •   Yes, many times 
•   Small messages via IMCA, offshore branch 
•   Incident in Germany, a crane in contact with electric railway cable 
6 •   Yes, not by name 
•   Flinterstar 
•   Enclose space entry 
•   Sinking of car carrier near Rotterdam 
•   Fishership guardship collision 
•   Man over board while unleashing containers on Humber river 
7 •   Falling rescue craft killing two people at a sister company 
8 •   Recent fatal accident on board ISV [Infield Support Vessel] in Brasil; 
received by coincidence from colleague 
•   Incidents mentioned in the ROS 
•   Incidents from a joint venture with Australian company 
•   Paper gCaptain 
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E.2 Reaction to this accident involving a colleague-organization by organization. 
The second category is related to the reaction to the mentioned accident.  
Interviewee Answers 
1 •   Can happen to us too 
•   Checking procedures 
•   Safety campaign with posters 
•   Dividing information in newsletters based on similarity with own 
company 
2 •   Not much, monitoring the results by the inspectorate and ports state 
control 
3 •   Not applicable, but normally information is received from oil and gas 
industry clustered by theme. If comparison is available, then it will be 
communicated within the company on board of the ships   
4 •   Accident communicated with ships of company by using Fleet News  
•   Fleet News also distributed on board the ships of captain-owners, 
also to show company safety thinking  
•   Share information on an independent intranet  
•   One-on-one recommendations were taken over  
•   New procedure implemented on board, audit for follow-up, sanctions 
if not implemented or followed  
•   Direction level shows attention for other accidents and reports 
5 •   High potential messages are shared 
•   Safety bulletin or safety alert 
•   Direction level hesitates to inform and share information; proud or 
code of honor 
•   If investigation is conducted by third party, company will not do the 
same; company waits for results of that investigation 
6 •   Waiting for results of investigation 
•   Not much, due to limited information 
•   Attention by IMO, MAIB and other third parties 
•   Recognizable circumstances concerning, crew, ship or company 
otherwise no attention, although very interesting 
•   Inform ships and stimulate to do something with it 
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7 •   Checking own rescue craft construction 
•   Two fast rescue crafts temporarily non-active 
8 •   Acknowledgment by own company, no reaction only that something 
like that can happen and should not happen within own company 
•   Informal meeting with operational level; no communication with 
higher levels 
 
 
E.3 Learning from this occurrence. 
The third category is related to the way the organization learned from this previous occurrence.  
Interviewee Answers 
1 •   Trying to change culture and thinking of crew members 
•   Only attention when big accident happens 
•   Did not learn because of other priorities 
•   Asking how did it happen and can this happen to us too 
2 •   Not much, it confirmed the feeling that hatch cover cranes create a 
dangerous working environment  
•   I conducted a scan on board and the results will be implemented 
3 •   Left to the crew members on board by distributing information and 
follow SMS communication line (safety committee, crew members 
will take precautions) 
4 •   Could happen on board of own ships too; be prepared and compare 
the incident with own situation on board  
•   Marked snap back zones, which created fake safety feeling, were 
replaced by one marking ‘danger zone’ when entering the mooring 
deck 
5 •   Compared with own situation 
6 •   Only when report is published 
•   Not much time to read, but you can mention the report and hopefully 
crew members are going to read it 
7 •   Checking construction 
•   Finding root cause 
8 •   We did not learn, we acknowledged the information 
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E.4 Definition of (safety) learning. 
The fourth category is related to the way the organization defines (safety) learning.  
Interviewee Answers 
1 •   Reading what is written 
•   Explain and demonstrate 
•   Changing culture on the long run  
•   Eliminating raid pace 
•   Taking care of different cultures 
2 •   Using incidents and near-misses to change thinking and attitude of 
crew members step by step  
•   Visiting the ships, listen to and advise crew members and return to 
make sure they understood  
•   Motivation, teaching and testing 
3 •   Sharing investigation reports  
•   Transparency concerning good and bad things  
•   Training and explaining why we do things  
•   Attitude is the condition for the safety perspective on board  
•   Safety thinking is busy with management system, risk assessments, 
reporting, etc 
4 •   Recognizing dangerous situations before becoming an accident  
•   Attitude change based on procedures that find the origin in accidents 
5 •   Getting better by using the positive and negative experience 
•   Sharing, even if it influences your position on the market as happens 
within the oil and gas branch 
6 •   Using experience to change to prevent things from happening again 
7 •   Find a root cause to an incident 
•   Easy when technical failure 
•   Something else when human failure; spit deeper to find a cause 
•   Question remains if procedures are good enough; unknown if not 
followed 
•   Culture change; starts with the introduction when recruited for 
company 
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8 •   Using PDCA-circle, producing reports, improving to become safer as 
organization or more efficient 
•   Learning from mistakes 
•   Improving performance is recognized by decreasing numbers, better 
numbers 
•   Content personnel 
•   Awareness, leaders as example 
•   Innovation, as other part of learning 
•   Attitude change 
•   Intrinsic motivation 
 
 
E.5 Incentives to learn from this occurrence. 
The fifth category is related to the incentives recognized to learn from this occurrence.  
Interviewee Answers 
1 •   The volume of the accident 
•   Relation with own experience 
•   Relation with own interest 
•   Issues which have attention and are discussed (ECDIS, IMO 
regulation) 
•   Receiving more and fast information of accident 
•   Based on public opinion 
•   A sudden accident in slow period 
2 •   Own interested which started at nautical college when one of his 
peers died during an accident on board with a welding machine. This 
was truly striking  
•   Hobbyhorse or tic, due to own experience 
3 •   Information from oil and gas industry 
4 •   Comparable accident on board comparable ships  
•   In line with own focus on incidents within the company  
•   In line with the focus of the branch  
•   Comparable with same procedures  
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•   Company was under observation by inspectorate, which caused a 
motivation to proof customers and authorities otherwise. So, keeping 
track of all possible risks of other accident investigation reports was 
in line with SMS to monitor own company risks 
5 •   Anonymous 
•   Comparable situation or activities 
6 •   Other parties are interested, so something is going on  
•   Recognizable situations 
•   Can happen to us too 
7 •   Publicity 
•   Can happen in our company too, the ships are al built at the same 
building company 
•   Information quickly available, small branch/world 
•   Same procedures 
•   Same SMS within company and on board 
8 •   Same tasks conducted by ships 
•   Recognize similarities 
•   Not mature enough to recognize other triggers 
 
 
E.6 Other possible incentives. 
The sixth category is related to other possible incentives generally available to enhance learning.  
Interviewee Answers 
1 •   Connecting using ship-owners society 
•   Easy access to information 
•   Money 
•   Inter-organizational communication 
•   Visualization (DVD’s on board, movies, slightly shocking pictures, 
AIS on Youtube) 
•   Investigation reports in English language 
•   Summary  
•   Title of report 
•   Recommendations (not always necessary) 
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2 •   Observe actively on board ships  
•   Distinguished technical investigation and anonymized personnel 
impact  
•   Give victims possibility to tell their story  
•   Focusing on themes  
•   Clear language  
•   Visualization using pictures or movies in line with ‘seconds from 
disaster’ or ‘air crash investigation’ 
•   Statistics 
3 •   Clear description of accident 
•   Anonymous 
•   Cartoons 
•   Pictures  
•   Make it possible that people can relive the accident within context 
•   Not a lot of pages in a report  
•   Easy language  
•   Correct terminology  
•   Complete package from the one who wrote the report in such a way 
that it can be distributed directly  
•   Statistics involving the company itself to find out her status in 
comparison to other companies 
4 •   Use KVNR as communication platform  
•   More attention for smaller accidents that are more important than big 
accidents  
•   Not only accidents but all incidents 
•   Transparency and openness  
•   General database with all reported incidents owned by one to find 
causes  
•   Anonymous 
5 •   Title of investigation (report) 
•   Context 
•   Summary including keywords 
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•   Which third party conducted investigation? Safety board is seen as a 
trustworthy party 
•   Easy accessible online 
6 •   Easy readable report; so, it can be read during a watch period 
•   Depending on the different types of people. There are people who 
can read and remember, there are people who do not read; perhaps 
use pictures 
•   Some persons have to be convinced with arguments, some people 
just follow orders 
•   Report written in simple or approachable language 
•   Question reader; could this happen to you? Questions in the report 
itself. 
•   Financially 
•   Detention 
•   Regulations to force to think about implementation 
•   Observe the occurrence from different angels, also the small incidents 
7 •   More incidents collected in one report 
•   Make it clear that reporting does not have to lead to blame and shame 
•   Report title 
•   Thoroughness of report, especially the human factor  
•   Investigators have to have credits from the maritime sector; they need 
to know what they are talking about 
•   According to my experience, the content is correct 
8 •   Continuously interaction with people 
•   Being part of what we are 
•   Accountabilities as interpreted by judges 
•   Not only focus on wrong issues which causes safety to decrease; focus 
on other methods to deal with issues to prevent negative outcomes 
•   Reports written by experts of an safety investigation board 
•   Report title 
•   Pictures with challenging captions 
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•   Sometimes only context is necessary, translation is done within 
company itself 
•   Summary 
•   Free of subjectivity or suggestions 
•   Different perspectives 
 
 
E.7 Possibility to learn from other organizations. 
The seventh category is related to the belief that learning from other organizations is possible.  
Interviewee Answers 
1 •   Yes, due to reporting culture within the oil and chemical branch  
•   Yes, due to information distribution within the branch 
2 •   Organizations are not willing to distribute incident information 
causing record damage   
•   No, there is no communication with other companies  
•   Only by reading investigation reports 
3 •   Organizations are not willing to distribute incident information due 
to competition and causing record damage  
•   Only possibility is something like IMCA, that collects information, 
makes it anonymous and distributes it again within the branch  
•   Or as KVNR using a database; at the end did it not work either; 
reporting was necessary, and the companies which reported 
everything were seen as unsafe while they were the safest  
•   KNVR should act and be used as discussion platform  
•   As long as blame culture continue to exist, there will not be voluntary 
incident reporting 
4 •   This is possible but difficult. My company is divided into ‘island 
culture’; an incident can hurt the whole company and not only one 
department  
•   Yes, but ‘what is in it for me?’ We are getting better, also as 
competitors, because accidents will not make us better performing 
within the branch  
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•   At the moment, this does not work because after every accident the 
inspectorate jumps on the situation which forces companies to act 
upon expectations and cost a lot of money 
5 •   Yes, is possible 
•   Within maritime branch difficult; has to do with culture (Dutch, 
Russian, Ukraine, Asian)  
•   Within oil and gas branch even competitors receive results of safety 
investigations 
•   Proud is in the way; dirty washing is laundered at home 
•   Independent reporting is not possible on board; everything goes via 
captain or first officer 
•   Safety mature companies can even learn from safety investigation 
reports concerning aviation accidents 
6 •   Slow process du to frequently changing crew, only three times a year 
conducting a visit on board, hopefully both captains will discuss 
during handover 
•   The business is reactive, as long as it going well there is no issue 
•   No, there is no time left due to the many regulations to think about 
own company 
•   There is no openness; if no investigation is conducted the company 
is happy; to prevent naming and shaming; Wagenborg safety culture 
investigation is good to learn from, but is killing for the investigated 
company  
•   Only when all crew members are able to report an incident; now not 
possible due to no access of internet by crew 
7 •   Yes, because our branch is very transparent 
•   Further outside the branch via the international institute CLIA 
•   On the other side, CEO’s do not want to see an accident as Costa 
Concordia in their company. This has changed the whole branch 
concerning training and ship building 
•   Depending how open to this method 
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8 •   No, name and blame; if an inspectorate is visiting not everything is 
told 
•   Yes, informal meetings world-wide 
 
 
E.8 Static safety information distribution. 
The eighth category is related to the way the safety information distribution is conducted statically.  
Interviewee Answers 
1 •   Distribution from office to management on board  
•   Safety meeting IAW SMS on board 
2 •   Up and down the organization IAW SMS 
•   Safety committee on board 
•   Safety observation cards once a month to meet performance criteria 
3 •   Safety committee on board with feedback reporting  
•   Monthly discussion with captains  
•   Semi-annual discussion with safety officers and chief engineers 
4 •   IAW SMS, from office to ship and discussed in safety meeting 
5 •   Safety alert and fleet news 
•   SMS 
•   Safety meeting 
6 •   Via internet 
•   During visits on board 
•   Safety meeting 
•   Uploading in internet system including summary 
7 •   Senior management conferences 
•   Communication between ship and shore always via captain 
•   Toolbox discussions 
8 •   Safety flash 
•   Uploading information in manage resource management accessible 
on board; no feedback received 
•   SMS explains also feedback to office 
•   Monthly reports are sent to senior management level 
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E.9 Dynamic safety information distribution. 
The ninth category is related to the way the dynamic safety information distribution is conducted.  
Interviewee Answers 
1 •   Ship dependent due to culture difference on board (young Filipines 
act differently compared to older colleagues)  
•   Difficult to determine, only based on ship visits on board and 
received investigation reports 
2 •   Not clear, but during holiday observing Indonesian people work 
makes me understand that sailing on board a high safety standard ship 
and presence of books which are difficult to read or not 
understandable, makes life difficult  
•   Planning to place an IPad onboard with a sailor version; hopefully 
will this increase safety attitude 
3 •   Not clear, but during holiday observing Indonesian people work 
makes me understand that sailing on board a high safety standard ship 
and presence of books which are difficult to read or not 
understandable, makes life difficult  
•   Planning to place an IPad onboard with a sailor version; hopefully 
will this increase safety attitude 
4 •   Not really only when on board for an audit  
•   The way incident reports are closed based on incomplete information 
or copy-paste from other reports, gives an idea  
•   Compared to a few years ago, the lower ranks on board are assertive 
enough to question staff members; so, people are growing concerning 
safety thinking  
•   Crew members of ships with Dutch or Eastern crew are questioning 
staff members on board indicating that something positive happens 
concerning safety thinking and attitude. This is something different 
on ships with Ukraine or Russia crew (are not loyal either)  
•   This difference in attitude is also observable during the different 
yearly officer meetings with staff  
•   Motivation of personnel 
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5 •   Difficult to find out; the company gives the captain the key of a 
twenty-million-euro ship and request him to establish contact 
frequently 
•   Difficult; one-on-one with ratings preferred but the company does 
not want to undermine the captain 
6 •   Supporting decisions of the captain although against commercial 
requests; also to prevent that the captain will not return to work for 
company; from there safety culture is built  
•   Personnel contact by telephone to discuss items to make captain 
personally interested before distributing 
•   Asking during visit what the office is doing good and not so good; 
dyslectic personnel on board do not read reports 
•   Results of working group sailors; usage of a beam with traffic light 
colors to question crew members about safety on board 
7 •   During coffeebreak ‘pikheet’  
•   I have an informal meeting during upcoming lunch 
8 •   Difficult to determine; the office inform the ships and that’s it 
•   There are ships which report executed drills as perfect; that is 
suspicious 
•   Depends on the different cultures on board; Dutch crew is trusted in 
comparison to Asian crew concerning focus on safety 
 
 
E.10 Remarks. 
The tenth category is related to the remarks which did not fit in the previous categories.  
Interviewee Answers 
1 •   Nice conversation also because looking at safety in a different way  
•   Normally no time to think or talk about safety due to time constraints. 
One of the reasons is the growth of the company from 13 to 21 ships 
in three years   
2 •   Interesting conversation with somebody from the safety world and 
that keeps me thinking  
•   Conventional crew members who are sailing for 20 or 30 years are 
now confronted with regulations. Most of the time these are 
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demanded by the customers. It is my responsibility to close that gap 
between regulations and how to deal with it practically. That is an 
ongoing process  
•   Investigation reports are considered true 
3 •   Interesting conversation with somebody from the safety world and 
that keeps me thinking  
•   Conventional, older crew members who are sailing for years is not 
used to the way of safety thinking as the younger generation. Older 
crew members are from the era skipper next to God. Having internal 
discussion how to get control of people to look at safety all the same  
•   Companies keep list of the number of PSC visits to use as 
competition means with customers 
4 •   People will not learn, examples as holding a fire door open day and 
night; people in the office used to sail too and they are (also) blind 
for some risks or dangers in working environment  
•   Russian crew members are always available and cheap  
•   Russians do not trust the government; I am Polish too and recognize 
that attitude  
•   Showing personal interest creates a bonding to get closer to a person 
and understand him  
•   Paris MOU international ranking vs national inspections and safety 
improvement with older ships and willing crew members; inspections 
are not directly related to safety 
5 •   Less safety performing companies measured by the number of 
reported incidents, undesired actions on working floor and results of 
baseline measurement 
•   Safety mature companies have more and dedicated resources to read 
reports and learn from it 
•   If results of own report are not the same as third party report it 
depends on team construction, not the investigation method; every 
method should lead to the same conclusion 
•   Internet on board of ships makes communication easier, though 
contact is still going via captain or first officer 
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•   Office members have to sail on board a ship to encounter the 
situation 
6 •   It is not about the investigating party, it is about the content of the 
report 
•   For the company, it is easier to transfer written reports instead of 
movies due to the many Mb’s 
•   Report in depth is of more value; experience with a third-party 
investigation was not positive 
•   Safety culture investigation was the start of a workgroup sailors to 
improve performance 
7 •   The nationality on board is decided by the expectations of customers; 
i.e. Dutch flagged ship with Dutch officers decides image of company 
•   We always liked to read the verdicts of the maritime board of justice; 
this was the only source of information; nowadays there is more 
media available; also, because the board did not understand the 
context 
8 •   Company is not yet mature concerning giving attention to different 
incidents and announcing these internally 
•   Abroad the company has to contract local sailors 
•   Different cultures need different approaches 
•   Written reports are the easiest way to distribute information 
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